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COMMENT
TESTER STANDING UNDER TITLE VII: A ROSE
BY ANY OTHER NAME
INTRODUCTION
Recently, the Urban Institute, a Washington, D.C., civil rights
group, commissioned a research study aimed at comparing the treat-
ment of black and white job seekers. The results indicated signifi-
cant employment discrimination against blacks.' For instance, in
one out of every five cases, the study found that a white applicant
advanced further through the hiring process than an equally quali-
fied black applicant.' The researchers concluded that "despite exten-
sive legislative and regulatory protections and incentives to hire mi-
norities, unfavorable treatment of young black men is widespread
and pervasive across firms offering entry-level jobs."3 One of the au-
thors of the study stated that the findings point out the need for the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC" or "Com-
mission") to reprioritize its allocation of resources. He argued that
the EEOC needs to focus more effort toward the area of hiring,
where extensive discrimination occurs but is difficult to uncover, ver-
sus continued efforts to investigate claims of discrimination against
already employed individuals.4
1. Urban Institute Research Using Testers Documents Bias Against Black Job Seekers, Daily
Lab. Rep. No. 94 (BNA), at A-4 (May 15, 1991). The study employed 476 sets of paired testers
who applied for jobs in Chicago and Washington, D.C. Each set of testers consisted of one black
and one white male who were matched on all characteristics that could affect a hiring decision.
The individual testers were trained to behave similarly throughout the interview sessions. The
audits were designed so that systematic differences in treatment by employers could only be at-
tributable to race. The results indicated that a black male was three times as likely to be unfavor-
ably treated as his white counterpart. Id. at A-4.
2. Id. at A-4. The white applicant was more likely to be asked to submit an application, to
receive a formal interview, or to receive a job offer. Black applicants, on the other hand, advanced
further than their white counterparts only seven percent of the time. id.
3. Id. Researchers also concluded that reverse discrimination against white applicants was far
less common, that unequal treatment was more likely to occur in white collar than in blue collar
jobs, and that discrimination was more prevalent in Washington, D.C., than in Chicago. Id.
4. Id. at A-5.
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Pursuant to its equal employment opportunity enforcement role,
the EEOC announced in December of 1990 that it would accept
employment discrimination complaints by civil rights groups, acting
on behalf of individuals who had posed as job applicants ("test-
ers"),' under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"
or "Act").' Predictably, this endorsement of testers was praised by
civil rights groups and criticized by employers and their attorneys.'
This use of testers as a vehicle for bringing Title VII claims raises
the legal issue of standing to sue. Essentially, standing requires a
plaintiff to allege a distinct and cognizable injury, to allege that the
injury was a result of the defendant's conduct, and to show that the
injury can be redressed by the court. These are threshold require-
ments for every plaintiff who wishes to have the merits of his or her
case heard by a federal court. No recent court has decided whether
testers in Title VII actions have standing, 8 but a tester standing case
5. EEOC Endorses Use of 'Testers' To Uncover Employment Discrimination, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 232, at A-I I (Dec. 3, 1990). The EEOC announced that it would consider the possi-
bility of using its own testers to investigate job discrimination as well. In supporting the new
policy, the EEOC indicated that discriminatory rejection itself constitutes an injury. It stated that
testers should have standing under Title VII even if they do not seek the jobs for which they are
applying; they simply have a statutory right not to have been rejected on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin. Employers Are Mounting Campaign To Head Off Use of Testers
in EEO Cases, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 134, at A-10 (July 12, 1991) [hereinafter Employers
Are Mounting Campaigns].
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988).
7. Employer groups stress that the use of testers is likely to generate suspicion and resentment,
that there is no need to resort to such potentially divisive methods, and that this approach consti-
tutes "trickery and deceit," Employers Are Mounting Campaign, supra note 5, at A-10. Civil
rights attorneys, along with the EEOC, argue that testers have been used successfully to enforce
fair housing laws. They say that this supports their use in the employment discrimination area as
well. Kevin M. McCarthy, EEOC Policy Allowing Testers Will Face Increasing Challenges,
NAT't. LJ., June 10, 1991, at 28.
8. In Lea v. Cone Mills Corp., 438 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1971), three black women asserted that
the defendant-employer broke the law by refusing to employ persons'of their race and sex, al-
though the employer did hire white female and black male workers. The district court found the
employer in violation of Title VII; however, it declined to grant the plaintiffs attorney's fees per-
mitted under the Act. The district court reasoned that, because the plaintiffs' primary motive was
to test the defendant's employment practice rather than to seek actual employment, they were not
entitled to such fees. Lea v. Cone Mills Corp., 301 F. Supp. 97, 102 (M.D.N.C. 1969), affd in
part and vacated in part, 438 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1971).
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's findings on the merits, but disagreed with re-
gard to attorney's fees. It found that, even though the plaintiffs did not primarily seek specific
employment, their victory in the case and the court's pronouncement of Title VII rights warranted
the granting of attorney's fees, consistent with the policy of encouraging private attorney general
actions. The court stated, "Plaintiffs should not be denied attorney's fees merely because theirs
was a 'test case'." Lea, 438 F.2d at 88. In so holding, the Fourth Circuit stamped its imprimatur
on the use of testers in Title VII actions, and arguably lent the practice a sort of legitimacy.
Nevertheless, other courts have either ignored the holding of Lea or have not been faced with a
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was recently filed in the Washington, D.C., District Court.9 The
court's standing analysis in that case, and the subsequent response
of other federal courts, will significantly impact Title VII enforce-
ment within the hiring context.10
This Comment discusses the meaning, purpose, and scope of Title
VII, and focuses upon the issue of tester standing within this con-
text. First, this Comment explores the use of testers. It then reviews
the specific aims of Title VII, its parameters, and the procedure that
it invokes. Next, the Comment interprets the meaning of Title VII
through the eyes of legislators and judges. An overview of the judi-
cial standing doctrine is then provided by outlining a number of im-
portant United States Supreme Court cases in this area and by ana-
lyzing litigation under Title VIII, a civil rights statute analogous to
Title VII. After assessing this background, and in light of the need
for broader enforcement of the guarantees of Title VII, this Com-
ment ultimately supports standing for testers in Title VII actions.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Role of Testers in Civil Rights Enforcement
A tester, at least in the civil rights context, is generally under-
stood to be an individual employed to collect evidence of discrimina-
tory behavior by a third party against a protected class or class
member." The fair housing arena provides a classic example of how
testers are utilized to collect such evidence. Typically, two individu-
case of testers seeking to invoke Title Vii, as Lea stands alone among reported Title VII cases
addressing tester standing. Employers Are Mounting Campaign, supra note 5, at A- 11. Its prece-
dential value is further questionable, given the passage of over twenty years since its publication.
Thus, while Lea should not be ignored in the Title VII tester standing field, the Lea court's abbre-
viated analysis provides little to build upon and the tester standing issue is not dispositively
addressed.
9. Fair Employment Council of Greater Wash. v. B.M.C. Mktg. Corp., No. 91-8909-NHJ
(D.D.C. filed July 9, 1991). In this case, four individuals hired by a civil rights group approached
an employment agency and sought referral to entry level jobs. Although the four testers possessed
similar backgrounds and experience, the two white testers were sent on employment interviews
while the two black testers were not. The black testers were named as plaintiffs in the complaint
filed by the civil rights group under the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and another local ordinance.
Employers Are Mounting Campaign, supra note 5, at A-I l.
10. McCarthy, supra note 7, at 28.
11. Evan Tsen Lee, DeConstitutionalizing Justiciability: The Example of Mootness, 105
HARV. L. REV. 605 (1992). Professor Lee discusses the tester-plaintiff in Havens Realty Corp. v.
Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982), and defines the tester there as a person with "no intentioA of
renting or buying [a home] in the neighborhood but rather . . . there only to collect evidence of
discriminatory behavior." Lee, supra, at 615-16 n.61.
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als, one black and one white, are dispatched by a civil rights group
to approach a real estate agent, seller, or landlord. These individuals
subsequently express an equal interest in the same property or type
of property. The test is to see whether the two are treated with
equal fairness and consideration by the agent, seller, or landlord.' 2
Testers serve varied purposes, depending upon the groups or inter-
ests that employ them. For instance, they are employed by research-
ers to provide empirical evidence of disparate treatment or impact
based-upon race, gender, or other protected traits. 13 Testers are also
employed by civil rights groups to provide evidence of discrimination
for use in litigation against the third-party discriminator."
As such, testers have become increasingly crucial to civil rights
enforcement as civil rights law and views toward discrimination in
the United States have evolved. Prior to the passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,15 racial discrimination was widespread and
seemingly overt.16 Arguably, racial discrimination is now met with
at least general public disapproval; 17 the discrimination that remains
12. lan Ayres. Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations, 104
HARV. L. REV. 817, 818-19 n.7. Professor Ayres describes this tester scenario and borrows its
methodology in his empirical analysis of discrimination against women and racial minorities in
negotiating with automobile dealers for new cars. In his study, Professor Ayres employed numer-
ous testers of different races and both genders to conduct more than 180 negotiations for new cars
at 90 Chicago-area dealerships.
The tests revealed that white males received significantly better prices on new cars than did
blacks and females. White women were forced to pay a 40% higher markup than white men,
black men had to pay twice the markup that white men paid, and black women were forced to pay
more than three times the markup imposed on white men, even though all the groups employed
the exact same bargaining techniques and strategy. Id. at 818-19.
The fair housing methodology for testers that Professor Ayres describes and borrows from is
evident in the cases of Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982), and Gladstone v.
Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979), both discussed infra note 14.
13. See supra note 12 (noting use of testers to study discrimination against blacks and women
in new car sales); supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text (noting the employment of testers to
document employment discrimination on the basis of race).
14. See Havens Realty Corp., 455 U.S. 363 (using testers to provide evidence of fair housing
discrimination); Gladstone, 441 U.S. 91 (use of fair housing testers); Fair Employment Council v.
B.M.C. Mktg. Corp., No. 91-8909-NHJ (D.D.C. filed July 9, 1991) (use of testers to provide
evidence of employment discrimination by an employment agency against blacks). In all these
cases, the testers were used not only to provide evidence of discrimination, but also to become
plaintiffs in actions against the discriminatory party whom they had tested.
15. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at scattered sections of U.S.C.).
16. See HR. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong, 2d Sess., reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2393,
2401 (noting the extent of discrimination against blacks in various areas of the country).
17. See David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in Employment:
The Case for Numerical Standards, 79 GEO. L.J. 1619 (1991). Professor Strauss asserts that,
after the 1964 Civil Rights Act was passed, "the consensus in favor of some form of civil rights
laws, and against racial discrimination, became virtually beyond challenge in mainstream political
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today is often well hidden and covert.' 8 Because of this shift, it has
become more difficult for putative plaintiffs to document purposeful
discriminatory treatment at the hands of their employers, landlords,
and others to whose biased conduct they are subject. Testers miti-
gate this evidentiary concern by providing documented proof of dis-
parate, discriminatory treatment. This is particularly true where the
testers are trained in such a way that unequal treatment can only be
explained on the basis of wrongful discriminatory motives. 9
Scholars now commonly use testers as research tools.2° Further-
more, the Supreme Court has directly endorsed their use as wit-
nesses and as plaintiffs in the fair housing context. 2' Yet the use of
testers to bring Title VII actions is a fairly recent and unproven
phenomenon. 2 In order to determine how their use is likely to be
met by courts, the parameters of Title VII must first be explored.
B. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Title VII is broadly directed toward eradicating discriminatory
employment practices.2" The Act imposes certain obligations, grants
specific rights, and establishes administrative machinery to enforce
those rights.24 Section 2000e-2 of the Act imposes obligations on
various groups, exempts certain conduct and certain classes of per-
sons from coverage, and establishes limits to its reach. 5 Under the
debate." Id. at 1619. Professor Strauss goes on to claim that "by the mid-1970s anyone who
would not publicly condemn racial discrimination was outside the boundary of acceptable political
debate," and that "[overt] discrimination essentially does not exist today." Id.
18. Id. at 1619.
19. For example, the testers employed in the Urban Institute Study were carefully matched on
all characteristics that could affect a hiring decision, except for race. They were subsequently
treated disparately, evidencing employer bias purely on the basis of race. See supra note 1.
20. See supra notes 1-4, 12 (discussing studies done by the Urban Institute and Professor Ian
Ayres in which testers were used).
21. See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982) (granting standing to a black
tester, under the Fair Housing Act, to sue a realtor for racial steering practices).
22. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing the EEOC's policy on Title VII
testers).
23. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971).
24. THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964: WHAT IT MEANS TO EMPLOYERS, BUSINESSMEN, UNIONS,
EMPLOYEES. MINORITY GROUPS I (BNA 1964) [hereinafter THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964:
WHAT IT MEANS].
25. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988). The Act provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(I) to fail or refuse to hire . . . any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin;
or
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Act, no employer may discharge, refuse to hire, or otherwise dis-
criminate against any individual on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex or national origin ("protected trait" or "protected group").26
Also, no employer may segregate, classify, or limit an employee in a
way that would deprive that person of employment opportunities or
affect the employee's job status on the basis of one or more of these
traits.27
Title VII, however, does not impose an affirmative obligation on
employers to rectify existing imbalances in workforce representation
by class or trait. 8 The Act clearly states that it is not to be inter-
preted to require any employer to grant preferential treatment to an
individual or group with one or more of the protected traits in order
to remedy representation imbalances.29 Thus, the Act is broadly
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportuni-
ties . . . because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id. § 2000e-2(a).
Section 2000e-2(e) of the Act exempts discrimination on the basis of religion, sex, or national
origin where membership in one of these specific classes is an occupational qualification that is
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular business. Id. § 2000e-2(e). Com-
munist party members are also exempted from the Act's coverage. Id. § 2000e-2(f).
In addition, section 2000e-2() limits the reach of the Act by indicating that the Act was not
meant to prescribe preferential employment treatment for members or groups previously subjected
to discrimination. Id. § 2000e-2().
26. Id. § 2000e-2(a).
27. Id. § 2000e-2(b). Employers are also proscribed from discriminating in training, from retal-
iating against employees who invoke the process of Title VII, and from publishing employment
notices that indicate preferences or limits based upon one or more of the protected traits. Id. §
2000e-3.
Title VII is also directed toward other groups that are not considered employers. Section 2000e-
2(b) applies to employment agencies and provides that no agency may fail to refer an individual
for employment, or otherwise discriminate against a person on the basis of one or more of the
protected traits. Id. § 2000e-2(b). Also, no agency may classify an individual or refer an individ-
ual for employment solely on the basis of one of the protected traits. Id. § 2000e-2(b). The
prohibitions against retaliation, as well as the provisions regarding training and advertising, which
apply to employers, also apply to employment agencies. Id. § 2000e-3.
Finally, labor organizations are brought under the Act's purview by section 2000e-2(c). These
groups may not exclude or expel any individual from membership on the basis of one or more of
the protected traits. Id. § 2000e-2(c)(I). Further, these groups may not segregate or classify for
membership any individual on the basis of one of the protected traits, 'id. § 2000e-2(c)(2), and
they may not cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate on the basis of one or more of
the protected traits, id. § 2000e-2(c)(3). The retaliation, advertising, and training provisions that
apply to employers also apply to labor organizations. Id. § 2000e-3.
28. Id. § 2000e-2(j) ("Nothing contained in this subchapter shall . . . require any employer
. . . to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group because of [a protected
trait].").
29. Id. Thus, Title VII does not establish a quota system. In fact, the Civil Rights Act of 1991
amends Title VII by making any adjustment of test scores, use of different cut-off scores, or other
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aimed at removing barriers to equal employment opportunity.3 0
Ultimately, if a complainant can provetthat he or she was victim-
ized by a type of discrimination to which Title VII applies, the Act
provides for a number of possible remedies. 1 First, the Act provides
for injunctive relief.3 2 Courts finding a violation of Title VII have
enjoined a wide range of discriminatory employer conduct engaged
in by employers including the use of physical measurements,33 the
use of discriminatory tests,3 4 and the imposition of educational re-
quirements without a legitimate purpose. 5 Despite this wide-rang-
ing relief granted to Title VII plaintiffs in the past, the relief likely
to be accorded successful Title VII testers remains speculative.3 6
Given the dictates of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, however, it is
conceivable that Title VII testers could be awarded equitable relief,
compensatory damages, and/or punitive damages.3 7
alteration of employment-related tests, on the basis of one of the protected traits, an unlawful
employment practice. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 106, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(l) (1988 & Supp. III 1991)).
30. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971) (concluding that Congress in-
tended Title VII to remove discriminatory barriers to employment).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988). Section 2000e-5(g) states:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally
engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the court
may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practices and
order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include but is not
limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, .... or any other equitable relief as
the court deems appropriate.
Id.
32. Id.
33. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (finding the use by an employer of height and
weight measurements discriminatory, and enjoining the use of such measurements in employment
decisions).
34. Guardian's Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 630 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding a written test
for police officers discriminatory, and enjoining use of the test), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 940 (1981).
35. Dozier v. Chupka, 395 F. Supp. 836 (S.D. Ohio 1975) (enjoining the employer's imposition
of a high school diploma requirement for firefighters).
36. In Lea v. Cone Mills Corp., 438 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1971), the court enjoined the employer's
continued discriminatory treatment and, contrary to the lower court, awarded attorney's fees to
the victorious plaintiffs who also happened to be testers. The court reasoned that the plaintiffs had
not only obtained an injunction against an unfair employment practice, but also had opened the
way for black women in the employer's plant. It held that attorney's fees should not be denied
merely because the plaintiffs acted as testers. Nevertheless,' the court went on to deny the plain-
tiffs' claim for equitable backpay. It found that the plaintiffs' primary motive as testers, coupled
with a lack of evidence to show that the employer hired other women with the plaintiffs' qualifica-
tions, precluded a backpay award. In sum, the court awarded only prospective relief.
37. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102(b), 105 Stat. 1071, 1072 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988 & Supp. II1 1991) ("A complaining party may recover punitive damages
under this section against a respondent . . . if the complaining party demonstrates that the re-
spondent engaged in a discriminatory practice or discriminatory practices with malice or with
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Second, the Act specifically provides for an order of reinstatement
or hiring, with or without backpay, to persons aggrieved.38 Third,
the Act provides for other affirmative, equitable relief as deemed
appropriate by the court.39 Under this provision, courts have ordered
discriminatory employers to grant various benefits to aggrieved indi-
viduals including tenure,40 promotions,41 and "frontpay. ' 42 Finally,
the Act provides for the recovery of attorney's fees for prevailing
plaintiffs. 43
While courts historically denied requests for compensatory and
punitive damages in straight Title VII actions, 44 plaintiffs sometimes
recovered such awards by joining a Title VII claim with another
civil rights cause of action.45 Of course, the Civil Rights Act of 1991
reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual.").
38. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1988); see Locke v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 660 F.2d
359 (8th Cir. 1981) (ordering that the person discriminated against be hired in a job above the
entry level on the basis of a Title VII violation); Spiva v. Copperweld Steel Co., 22 Fair Emp.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 900 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (ordering that an unlawfully discharged plaintiff be
reinstated and be granted seniority, retirement, pension, and pay benefits that the plaintiff would
have had absent the discharge).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).
40. Kunda v. Muhlenberg College, 621 F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that a college instruc-
tor should be awarded retroactive tenure by his employer upon completion of a master's degree
within two years).
41. See Snead v. Harris, 22 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1434 (D.D.C. 1980) (ordering that
the plaintiff be promoted retroactively).
42. See Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stockade, Inc., 624 F.2d 945 (10th Cir. 1980) (ordering that the
plaintiff be granted five years of pay in lieu of restatement because of the employer's hostility
toward the employee).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1988). It is not necessary that the plaintiff actually be restored to
his former job or qualify for the job sought in order to prevail and be awarded such fees. See King
v. Trans World Airlines, 738 F.2d 255 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding that an individual who proved
that he was discriminated against in an interview process was a prevailing party in the suit, even
though the employer demonstrated that the individual would not have been hired absent any dis-
crimination). Furthermore, attorney's fees have been awarded to prevailing plaintiffs for time
spent at mandatory administrative proceedings related to their Title VII claim. See Curtis v. Bill
Hanna Ford, Inc., 822 F.2d 549 (5th Cir. 1987) (reversing the holding of the district court and
awarding attorney's fees to the prevailing plaintiff for time spent on EEOC hearings).
44. BARBARA L. SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw 543 (2d ed.
Supp. 1988); see Boddy v. Dean, 821 F.2d 346 (6th Cir. 1987) (settling beyond dispute that a
plaintiff may not recover either compensatory or punitive damages in a Title VII action); Walker
v. Ford Motor Co., 684 F.2d 1355 (1 Ith Cir. 1982) (adopting the rule that compensatory and
punitive damages are unavailable in Title VII suits, but cautioning that the ban on such damages
does not include fringe benefits, pension benefits, or other employment benefits that, at times, have
been referred to as damages); Padway v. Palches, 665 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1982) (concluding that
Congress ihtentionally left out of Title VII any provision for either general or punitive damages,
and that Title VII provides only for equitable relief, including backpay).
45. See. e.g., Ambrose v. United States Steel Corp., 39 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 35 (N.D.
Cal. 1985) (awarding punitive damages in a joint Title VII/California State Civil Rights action);
Jackson v. Wakulla Springs & Lodge, 33 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1301 (N.D. Fla. 1983)
1224
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now permits a complaining party who sues under Title VII alone to
recover compensatory and punitive damages in certain circum-
stances46 and up to established dollar limits.4 7 A prevailing Title VII
plaintiff, including a tester, may thus expect to receive injunctive
relief, monetary, compensatory or punitive damages, other equitable
relief, and/or attorney fees incurred in the process of bringing an
action."8
Given the dictates of Title VII, it is important to understand how
the Act was intended to operate and how it actually operates. In this
regard, what immediately follows is a discussion of the primary the-
ories of recovery in employment discrimination cases. Following this
is a brief overview of the Title VII claim procedure. Finally, the
purpose of Title VII is explored by looking to the language of the
Act and interpretations of that language.
1. The Primary Theories of Recovery Under Title VII
Most Title VII claims may be grouped into one of two large cate-
gories of discrimination; namely, either disparate treatment discrim-
ination or disparate impact discrimination. At issue in disparate
treatment discrimination is whether the plaintiff was subjected to
different treatment because of membership in a protected class.4" At
issue in disparate impact discrimination is whether some facially
(awarding punitive and compensatory damages in a joint Title VII/42 U.S.C. § 1981 action).
46. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 extended the availability of compensatory and punitive dam-
ages to victims of intentional discrimination under Title VII. Compensatory damages are available
only in cases of intentional discrimination, and punitive damages are available only to plaintiffs
who can prove that the defendant-employer engaged in a discriminatory practice with malice or
reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of the plaintiff. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b)(1)
(1988 & Supp. III 1991)).
47. Id. § 1981(b)(3). The 1991 Civil Rights amendments limit the sum of compensatory and
punitive damages awardable to each complainant to $50,000 for employers with 14 to 100 em-
ployees, $100,000 for employers with 101 to 200 employees, $200,000 for employers with 201 to
500 employees, and $300,000 for employers with over 500 employees in each of twenty or more
calendar weeks during the preceding or current calendar year. Id.
48. Again, testers, by definition, will likely base their claims on a disparate treatment theory of
discrimination. Pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, disparate treatment plaintiffs who can
prove intentional discrimination may be awarded compensatory and/or punitive damages. Id. §
1981(b)(I). Of course, this raises the issue of whether testers should be granted the same mone-
tary relief as that accorded other successful Title VII plaintiffs. The issue is resolvable by assess-
ing the standing of testers to raise Title VII claims. Because the standing doctrine invokes redres-
sability as one of its required elements, it seems that a tester who meets this, as well as the other
standing requirements, should be granted the same remedies as other plaintiffs properly before the
court. This, of course, does not negate any requirements that are properly imposed upon plaintiffs
to prove their damages.
49. SCHLEI & GROSSMAN. supra note 44, at 13.
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neutral employment practice adversely impacted a protected class
member. 50 These theories of discrimination will be discussed in turn.
a. Disparate treatment discrimination
The essence of disparate treatment discrimination is the different
treatment, for better or worse, of similarly situated persons.51 The
United States Supreme Court stated that this theory is "the most
easily understood type of discrimination. The employer simply treats
some people less favorably than others because of [one of the pro-
tected traits]." 52 While this theory requires the plaintiff to prove
discriminatory motive, such motive may be inferred from the "mere
fact of differences in treatment."" a
While the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of proving inten-
tional discrimination, courts follow a three-step allocation of bur-
dens in the majority of disparate treatment cases.54 The Supreme
Court clarified this allocation in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green.55 There, a black mechanic sued the McDonnell Douglas Cor-
poration under Title VII, alleging that the company refused to re-
hire him because of his race and his involvement in the civil rights
movement.5" Ultimately, the Supreme Court remanded the case to
the district court for a determination consistent with its opinion.
First, however, the Court addressed a number of important issues
within the Title VII context, chief among which was the proper or-
der and allocation of proof in a private employment discrimination
50. Id. at 82-83. The issue of tester standing generally falls into the disparate treatment cate-
gory of discrimination. Testers present an employer with a choice between individuals possessing
equal qualifications but different race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Therefore, an em-
ployer who consistently chooses a person belonging to an unprotected class over a person belonging
to a protected class for employment, where qualifications for that employment are essentially iden-
tical, is guilty of intentional, or disparate treatment, discrimination.
51. Id. at 13.
52. International Bd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977).
53. Id.
54. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); Legrand v. Uni-
versity of Ark. at Pine Bluff Trustees, 821 F.2d 478 (8th Cir. 1987); Sylvester v. Callon Energy
Servs., Inc., 781 F.2d 520 (5th Cir. 1986); see also Sumner v. San Diego Urban League, Inc., 681
F.2d 1140 (9th Cir. 1982) (remanding case for findings showing the required three-step analysis
rather than simply the ultimate issue). But see Monroe v. Burlington Indus., 784 F.2d 568 (4th
Cir. 1986) (affirming the district court decision and holding that the trier of fact was allowed to
consider evidence used to demonstrate the plaintiff's prima facie case to resolve the issue of
whether the defendant's explanation was pretextual).
55. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
56. Id. at 796.
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case.5
7
The Court held first that the Title VII plaintiff carried the initial
burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. It found
that he could carry this burden by proving: (I) that he belonged to a
racial minority; (2) that he applied and was qualified for a job for
which the employer was seeking applicants; (3) that despite his
qualifications, he was rejected by the-employer; and (4) that after
his rejection, the position. sought remained open, and the employer
continued to seek applications from persons with the plaintiff's qual-
ifications, or the position was filled by a member of the nonprotected
class. 58- The Court found that the plaintiff in McDonnell Douglas
carried this burden, and thus that he established a presumption of
illegal discrimination. 5
Once the plaintiff established a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion, the Court held that the burden shifted to the defendant em-
ployer.60 To escape a finding of intentional discrimination, the court
held, the employer must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the employee's rejection.61 In McDonnell Douglas, the
Court found that the employer met this burden by pointing to the
plaintiff's unlawful conduct, including his past participation in a
civil rights protest that disrupted business. According to the Court,
"[niothing in Title VII compels an employer to absolve and rehire
one who has engaged in such deliberate, unlawful activity against
it." 2 It thus found that the employer sufficiently responded to the
plaintiff's prima facie case.6 3
Nevertheless, the Court explained that the inquiry must not end
upon the employer's successful rebuttal. It reasoned that Title VII
does not permit an employer to use evidence of the employee's con-
duct as a mere pretext for invidious discrimination against that em-
57. Id.
58. Id. at 802.
59. Id. The Court noted that "[p]etitioner sought mechanics, respondent's trade, and continued
to do so after respondent's rejection. Petitioner, moreover, does not dispute respondent's qualifica-
tions and acknowledges that his past work performance in petitioner's employ was 'satisfactory.'"
Id.
60. Id.; see also Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (clarifying
burdens in disparate treatment action).
61. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
62. Id. at 803. The Court noted that, in this case, the plaintiff's activity was directed specifi-
cally against the employer. It refused to consider whether conduct not directed against the partic-
ular employer may be legitimate grounds for refusal to hire. Id. at 803 n.17.
63. Id. at 803.
19921 1227
DEPA UL LA W RE VIE W
ployee."4 Therefore, the Court remanded and directed the lower
court to afford the plaintiff-employee an opportunity to show that
the employer's stated reason for its action was a mere pretext for
purposeful discrimination. The Court explained that relevant to such
a showing would be evidence that the employee was treated differ-
ently than white employees involved in similar acts against the em-
ployer. Other relevant showings advocated by the Court included
evidence of the employer's past discriminatory policies and
practices. 5
As might be expected, many Title VII cases involve a disagree-
ment over the real reason for the employer's conduct, and are
deemed mixed-motive cases."' Where there is evidence showing both
a discriminatory motive for an employment decision, proffered by
the plaintiff employee, and a legitimate, nondiscriminatory motive
for an employment decision, proffered by the employer, the Court
has altered the allocation of burdens set out in McDonnell
Douglas.7
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,8 the Court was faced with just
such a situation. In Price Waterhouse, a senior manager in an ac-
counting firm was passed over for partnership, partially on the basis
of sex,6 9 and partially on the basis of shortcomings in interpersonal
skills." The Court found that a balancing of an employee's Title
VII protection and employer's freedom of choice requires a different
analysis from that used in straight disparate treatment cases. It held
that an employer may not be held liable under Title VII, in mixed-
motive circumstances, if the employer could prove that it would
64. Id. at 804.
65. Id. at 804-05. The Court pointed out that statistics as to petitioner's employment practices
would be helpful to determine whether the employer's refusal to rehire the plaintiff conformed to a
pattern of discrimination. id. In this regard, the use of testers to at least provide evidence of
employment discrimination in Title VII actions appears implicitly endorsed by the McDonnell
Douglas Court.
66. Scin.hi & GROSSMAN. supra note 44, at 25 ("[T]he vast majority of disparate treatment
cases continue to depend on the issue of pretext, with comparative evidence being the primary
type of proof.").
67. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 807.
68. 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality).
69. Id. at 235. The individual at Price Waterhouse responsible for informing the plaintiff of the
reasons for her being passed over advised her that she should "walk more femininely, talk more
femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry." Id.
70. Id. at 234-35. The Court noted that "both supporters and opponents of her candidacy indi-
cated that she was sometimes overly aggressive, unduly harsh, difficult to work with, and impa-
tient with staff." Id.
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have come to the same decision regarding the plaintiff-employee's
status with the company even if it had not applied the discrimina-
tory basis for its decision.71 In essence, the Court found that if the
employer could show that its legitimate reason for the employment
decision, standing alone, "would have induced it to make the same
decision, 72 that decision will not later be the subject of the em-
ployer's liability for discriminatory employment practices.73
While this altered mixed-motive analysis is certainly interesting,
it also is rendered ineffective by enactment of the Civil Rights Act
of 1991. Under the 1991 Act, a plaintiff successfully proves an un-
lawful employment practice by showing merely that the defendant-
employer was motivated by a single prohibited factor. This is so
even if the employer can show that other legitimate and lawful fac-
tors also motivated its employment decision.7
Nevertheless, should an employer be able to demonstrate that it
would have taken the same employment action, even absent the dis-
criminatory reason for doing so, a court is precluded by the Act
71. Id. at 242. The Court went to great lengths to explain that it was not amending the burden
allocation set out in earlier cases involving discriminatory treatment. It reasoned that
since we hold that the plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion on the issue of
whether gender played a part in the employment decision, the decision before us is
not one of shifting burdens that we addressed in Burdine. Instead, the employer's
burden is most appropriately deemed an affirmative defense: the plaintiff must per-
suade the fact-finder at one point, and then the employer, if it wishes to prevail, must
persuade it on another.
Id. at 246.
72. Id. at 252.
73. Id. at 253-54. The Court found that the employer had the burden of proving this by a
preponderance of the evidence. In so holding, it rejected the lower court's determination that the
employer must prove its legitimate basis by clear and convincing evidence. It found that conven-
tional rules of civil litigation apply to Title VII actions and that such rules generally require proof
only by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. It thus reversed the appellate court's judgment
against Price Waterhouse and remanded the case for further proceedings. Id. at 258.
Though the Price Waterhouse Court imposed the obligation on the employer to prove that its
legitimate reason for the action alone warranted the action taken, it is unclear how the employer
would prove this. The plurality stated that "in most cases, the employer should be able to present
some objective evidence as to its probable decision in the absence of an impermissible motive." Id.
at 252 (emphasis added). Justice White concurred in the judgment but disagreed on the objective
evidence requirement. He found no basis for imposition of an objective evidence requirement on
the employer. Id. at 261 (White, J., concurring). Thus, under either analysis, objective evidence is
not mandatory. Of course, this decision is seemingly rendered moot by enactment of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991.
74. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1988 & Supp. III 1991)). This amendment to Title V11 states:
"Except as otherwise provided in this title, an unlawful employment practice is established when
the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a moti-
vating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice."
Id.
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from awarding damages or from requiring reinstatement, hiring, or
promotion. 5 Courts may continue, however, to award declaratory
relief, injunctive relief, attorney's fees, and costs. 76 These amend-
ments are particularly pertinent to this Comment because testers, by
definition, allege discriminatory treatment by employers. In the con-
text of hiring and other employment decisions, employers may be
able to demonstrate legitimate reasons for their decisions. Yet the
1991 Act indicates that any discriminatory motive will render an
employer's conduct unlawful regardless of any other circum-
stances.7  Thus, a tester denied employment for both legitimate and
discriminatory reasons may still prevail against a discriminating em-
ployer, and may enjoin that employer's future discriminatory
conduct. 8
Still, some plaintiffs may be unable to prove that an employer
intentionally discriminated in hiring, promotion, or some other job-
related conduct. Indeed, commentators have acknowledged that to-
day's discrimination is no longer overt, but is well concealed.79 If
this is true, plaintiffs may have some difficulty procuring evidence of
an employer's discriminatory motives. Yet this possible frustration
should not necessarily preclude plaintiffs from bringing Title VII
claims under a disparate impact theory of discrimination.
b. Disparate impact discrimination
The second theory under which a plaintiff may recover for a Title
VII violation is termed disparate impact discrimination. In such
cases, the employer's policy or conduct may have such an adverse
impact on a protected class that discriminatory intent should be pre-
sumed from the facts, even if a discriminatory motive cannot be
proved. 81 Similar to disparate treatment cases, courts in disparate
impact cases generally impose a three-step allocation of burdens.
Part of this allocation is evident in the seminal case of Griggs v.
75. Id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(ii).
76. Id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i).
77. Id. § 2000e-2(m).
78. Id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i).
79. See supra note 17 (discussing one commentator's view on the existence of overt workplace
discrimination today).
80. SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 44, at 83.
81. Id.; see Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) ("If an employment practice
which operates to exclude [a protected class] cannot be shown to be related to job performance,
the practice is prohibited.").
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Duke Power Co. 82
First, the plaintiff-employee bears the initial burden in disparate
impact cases. The employee must show that an employer's policy or
practice has had a statistically adverse impact on a protected class. 83
In Griggs, black employees brought a Title VII suit against their
employer, who had established high school diploma and intelligence
test requirements for certain jobs previously held only by white em-
ployees. At trial, the plaintiffs proved that this requirement effec-
tively precluded blacks from higher paying jobs with the company,
even though the requirements were applied prospectively to all em-
ployees seeking promotion or transfer to one of the higher paying
jobs. The plaintiffs alleged that the requirements were thus being
used by the employer to preserve the effects of past racial
discrimination .84
In assessing the plaintiffs' claim, the Court found that the plain-
tiffs had met their initial burden of showing that an employer's pol-
icy or practice had a statistically adverse impact on a protected
class.8 5 Evidence reflected that whites met the company require-
ments far easier than blacks, and that blacks were effectively pre-
cluded from obtaining higher paying jobs.86 Since plaintiffs had met
this initial burden of showing adverse impact, the Court found fur-
ther inquiry necessary.87
82. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The Griggs case is discussed throughout this Comment, notwithstand-
ing its temporary overruling by the decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642
(1989), because of its reinstatement and codification in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The Act
states explicitly that one of its purposes is to "codify the concepts of 'business necessity' and 'job
related' enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co." 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988
& Supp. 11 1991). It thus reinstates the requirement that an employer charged with an employ-
ment practice that has a discriminatory impact must demonstrate that its policy not only is job
related, but is also warranted by a business necessity. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(C). In this way, the Act
effectively overrules the Wards Cove decision on this point.
83. SCHLEI & GROSSMAN. supra note 44, at 82.
84. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 428. The Court agreed that there had been no showing of overt inten-
tional discrimination by the employer against the plaintiffs. Yet it found that this did not preclude
a finding of Title VII discrimination. Id. at 429.
85. Id. at 430. The plaintiff may also, for instance, show that an employment test selects those
from a protected class at a significantly lesser rate than it selects those belonging to an unpro-
tected class. Moore v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 593 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam)
(holding that a test's validity is irrelevant unless the plaintiff meets this initial burden).
86. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430. Statistics reflected that, while 34% of white males had completed
high school in the subject state, only 12% of black males had done so. With respect to the intelli-
gence tests employed, evidence reflected that 58% of whites passed, while only 6% of blacks
passed the same test. Id. at 430 n.6.
87. Id. at 429-30. Subsequent courts have stated that the plaintiff must establish the causal
connection between the adverse impact and the employer's conduct by a preponderance of the
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Once this adverse impact is shown, the burden shifts to the em-
ployer. To escape liability, the employer must show that its policy or
practice was job related.88 In Griggs, the Court found that both the
high school diploma requirement and the intelligence testing were
adopted without a thorough analysis by the employer of their rela-
tion to job performance. In fact, evidence indicated that employees
hired prior to the adoption of diploma and testing requirements con-
tinued to perform their jobs satisfactorily and were making progress
in their respective departments.89 The Court held that the require-
ments were unnecessary for effective or improved job performance;
therefore, the employer had failed to prove job relatedness. 90 In dis-
parate impact cases then, the employer must prove that the test or
policy is applied to select candidates on the basis of necessary quali-
fications and not on the basis of one of the protected traits.9 1
Finally, should the employer successfully rebut the evidence of
disparate impact, the burden reverts back to the plaintiff. The plain-
tiff must then show that, even if the employer's test or policy is job
related, it does not constitute a business necessity. 92 The plaintiff
evidence. See e.g., Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986) (finding that a causal connection
must be shown by a preponderance of the evidence, and that such does not require scientific
accuracy).
88. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431 ("If an employment practice which operates to exclude [blacks]
cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited.").
89. Id. at 431-32. The Court noted that the percentage of white employees over a given period
of time who were promoted but who were not high school graduates was similar to the percentage
of nongraduates in the entire workforce. Id. at 432 n.7.
90. Id. at 431.
91. Id. But see Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (agreeing that the
burden of producing evidence of a legitimate business justification for practices or policies with a
discriminatory impact shifts to the employer, but holding that the burden of persuasion rests with
the plaintiff-employees at all times).
The Civil Rights, Act of 1991 effectively overruled the Wards Cove decision. Section 2 of the
Act declares, "The Congress finds that . . . (2) the decision of the Supreme Court in [Wards
Cove] has weakened the scope and effectiveness of federal civil rights protections." 42 U.S.C. §
1981 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). Furthermore, section 3 of the Act states that it is intended, par-
tially, to codify the concepts of "business necessity" and "job related" enunciated in Griggs, and
to provide statutory guidelines for the adjudication of disparate impact suits under Title VII. Id.
Finally, the Act amends Title VII by directing that an unlawful employment practice based on
disparate impact is established only if the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of disparate
impact discrimination, and the employer "fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job
related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity." Id. § 2000e-
2 (k)(I)(A)(i).
92. Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975). The Court explained that, "[i]f an
employer. . . meet[s] the burden of proving that its tests are 'job related,' it remains open to the
complaining party to show that other tests or selection devices, without a similarly undesirable
racial effect, would also serve the employer's legitimate interest in 'efficient and trustworthy work-
manship.' " Id. at 425.
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meets this burden by furnishing an alternate test or policy that
would have a comparable business utility to that implemented by
the employer, but would have less of an adverse impact on a pro-
tected class. 3
While the preceding discussion of theories of discrimination is by
no means exhaustive, it provides a useful basis for better under-
standing the scope and purpose of Title VII. An overview of the
Title VII procedural machinery may also enlighten the analysis of
tester standing.
2. The Procedure for Filing a Title VII Claim
The procedure for enforcing one's Title VII rights varies depend-
ing upon the state in which the alleged violation occurred. Accord-
ing to Title VII, if an allegedly unlawful employment practice oc-
curred in a state that provides an administrative remedy for injuries
resulting from such a practice ("deferral jurisdiction"), the com-
plainant must exhaust this state remedy first. 4 However, assuming
that the Title VII violation occurs in a state without an applicable
fair employment remedy ("non-deferral jurisdiction"), a hypotheti-
cal Title VII procedure would operate as follows. 5
To set the Title VII machinery in motion, an individual must file
93. Id. at 425. Disparate impact discrimination under Title VII was recently strengthened by
Congress via the Civil Rights Act of 1991. See supra note 91.
94. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1988). This subsection states that "no charge may be filed . . . by
the person aggrieved before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced
under the state or local law." Id.
Title VII complainants should be aware, however, that exhaustion of their state administrative
remedy, coupled with an adverse state court review of the administrative determination, may pre-
clude a subsequent suit over the same case in federal district court. JOEL W. FRIEDMAN &
GEORGE M. STRICKLER. JR., THE LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 398 (2d ed. 1987).
In Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982), a plaintiff filed an employment
discrimination charge, and the EEOC referred this charge to the administrative agency in the
plaintiff's state for review. The state agency concluded that there was no probable cause for the
complaint, so the plaintiff sought state court review of this determination. The state court affirmed
the state agency decision, and the plaintiff filed a Title VII action in federal district court. Both
the district and the federal appellate courts dismissed the plaintiff's federal claim on the basis of
res judicata, holding that the state court's final determination of no probable cause for the plain-
tiff's complaint precluded federal judicial review of the same issue.
The Supreme Court, by a 5-4 vote, affirmed. It held that a plaintiff has no absolute right to
"relitigate in federal court an issue resolved by a state court." Id. at 473. The Court found that
the general rules of res judicata apply to Title VII actions. Id. at 485. But cf University of Tenn.
v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788 (1986) (holding that unreviewed state administrative determinations were
not meant by Congress to have a preclusive effect on Title VII claims).
95. For a useful discussion of the Act's practical application, see THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF
1964: WHAT IT MEANS. supra note 24.
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an unlawful employment practice charge with the EEOC.96 Within
ten days of this filing, the EEOC must serve notice of the charge on
the employer,97 and thereafter it will investigate the complaint to
determine whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the
charge is true.98 If the EEOC finds that there is reasonable cause
for the complaint, it will attempt to eliminate the employer's dis-
criminatory practices through the informal methods of conference,
conciliation, and persuasion. 99
If the Commission is unable to obtain voluntary compliance by
the employer within thirty days after the charge is filed, it may
bring a civil action against the employer.' 0 Again, should the Com-
mission choose not to do so, based upon its investigation of reasona-
ble cause, or if it fails to do so within the prescribed time limits, it
will notify the aggrieved individual.' Thereafter, the aggrieved in-
dividual may file a civil action against the employer in federal dis-
trict court, regardless of whether the Commission found reasonable
cause for the charge.'02
96. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1988) ("A charge under this section shall be filed within one
hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred and notice of
the charge . . . shall be served upon the person against whom such charge is made within ten
days thereafter .... ").
Again, this 180-day period refers to states without an administrative remedy for employment
discrimination (non-deferral jurisdictions). In states possessing an administrative remedy (deferral
jurisdictions), the complainant must file a charge with the EEOC within 300 days after the al-
leged unlawful employment practice occurred. Id. § 2000e-5(c).
97. Id. § 2000e-5(e).
98. Id. § 2000e-5(b) ("Whenever a charge is filed by or on behalf of a person claiming to be
aggrieved . . . the [EEOC] . . . shall make an investigation thereof.").
99. Id. ("If the Commission determines after such investigation that there is reasonable cause
to believe that the charge is true, the Commission shall endeavor to eliminate any such alleged
unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion.").
Should the EEOC find that there is no reasonable basis for the charge, it notifies both the claim-
ant and the respondent of its findings. The EEOC's reasonable cause determination must be made
within 120 days of the claimant's filing of the charge. Id.
100. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(l).
101. Id. § 2000e-5(b). The Commission has 120 days from the filing of the charge to make its
determination. Id.
102. The complainant must file in district court within 90 days of this notification. Id. § 2000e-
5(f)(l). The complainant also has the right to intervene should the EEOC, upon a finding of
probable cause and a failure to secure resolution through informal methods, bring an action
against the Title VII violator. Id.
If the court finds in favor of the plaintiff, it may enjoin the discriminatory practice, order rein-
statement or hiring, or provide other equitable relief. Id. § 2000e-5(g). Furthermore, the court
may order the payment of reasonable attorney's fees and customary costs to a prevailing plaintiff.
Id. § 2000e-5(k) ("In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in its discretion,
may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs."). Should the
employer refuse to comply with the court's order, the EEOC may seek to compel compliance in a
1234
TITLE VII TESTER STANDING
This statutory process allows the EEOC to respond to charges of
discrimination and to prevent any employer, agency, or union from
continuing to engage in any unlawful employment practice as set
forth in the Act.1" 3 However, the EEOC's authority does not end
there. While the Act directs the Commission to seek voluntary com-
pliance by the employer,"0 4 the Commission is also empowered to
investigate possible Title VII violators prior to specific charges of
discrimination. 0 5
The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972106 expanded the
EEOC's enforcement powers by conferring upon it the authority to
investigate, file complaints, and bring actions against alleged Title
VII violators." 7 Within this context, the EEOC has discretionary
power to decide which suits it wishes to prosecute.' 0 8 These powers
were further expanded when the EEOC was assigned responsibility,
formerly reserved for the Attorney General, to bring suits against
persons believed to be engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimi-
nation in contravention of the Act.'09 The expansion in powers ac-
corded the EEOC by Congress confirms that Title VII aims to do
more than merely redress specific instances of job discrimination.
Indeed, the EEOC defines its mission as "insur[ing] equality of op-
portunity by vigorously enforcing federal legislation prohibiting dis-
crimination in employment through investigation, conciliation, regu-
lation in the federal sector, and through education, policy research
and provision of technical assistance.""10
contempt proceeding. Id. § 2000e-5(i) ("In any case in which an employer, employment agency,
or labor organization fails to comply with an order of a court issued in a civil action brought
under this section, the Commission may commence proceedings to compel compliance with such
order.").
103. Id. § 2000e-5(a) ("The Commission is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any
person from engaging in any unlawful employment practice as set forth in [the Act].").
104. Id. § 2000e-5(b) ("[Tlle Commission shall endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlaw-
ful employment'practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation and persuasion.").
105. Id. § 2000e-5(a) ("The Commission is empowered ... to prevent any person from engag-
ing in any unlawful employment practice as set forth . . . in this title.").
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.; see also General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 323-24 (1980) (noting that federal
law "specifically authorizes the EEOC to bring a civil action to secure appropriate relief").
109. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(c).
110. EEOC AND THE LAWS IT ENFORCES: A REFERENCE MANUAL (Gov't Printing Office publ.
1988).
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3. The Purpose of Title VII
The primary purpose of Title VII's enactment was first to assure
equality of employment opportunity, and second to remove the dis-
criminatory practices that prevent such equality."1 ' The language of
the Act, the legislative history surrounding it, and the Supreme
Court's interpretation of that language all illustrate this broad
purpose.
a. Statutory language
Congress's objective in enacting Title VII is plain from the lan-
guage of the statute. 1 2 First, the drafters of the final bill gave it a
broad scope. The remedies provision of Title VII accords the right
to a private cause of action to any "person claiming to be ag-
grieved."' 1 3 Furthermore, the Act forbids not only discrimination by
employers but also by labor organizations" 4 and employment agen-
cies. 15 Thus, commentators have urged that Title VII does more
than remedy specific instances of job discrimination. Rather, these
scholars assert that the Act is aimed more expansively at redressing
job discrimination in general."' The legislative history surrounding
11l. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971).
112. Id. at 429.
113. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e:5(f)(1) (1988). Courts have interpreted this provision to encompass not
only persons directly discriminated against in the workplace, but also those indirectly impacted by
job bias. See e.g., Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978) (holding that persons who
had not applied for jobs could recover seniority relief if they could show, among other things, that
they were deterred from applying for vacant jobs by the employer's discriminatory practices);
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975) (finding that "[e]ven in the absence of injury to itself,
an association may have standing solely as the representative of its members").
114. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c); see EEOC v. Local 638, 401 F. Supp. 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(holding that refusal of a union to attempt to organize all union shops in its jurisdiction was based
on desire to deny nonwhite workers the employment opportunities granted whites); Schultz v.
Local 1291, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 338 F. Supp. 1204 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (holding that union
bylaw that allocated offices between white and "colored" race was invalid as an unreasonable
qualification on the right of members to be candidates and to hold offices in the union).
115. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b); see Schattman v. Texas Employment Comm'n, 330 F. Supp. 328
(N.D. Tex. 1971) (holding that this statutory provision applies not only to referral activities of
employment agencies, but also to agencies' own manpower and staffing practices).
116. See Linda S. Greene, Title VII Class Actions: Standing at its Edge?, 58 U. DET. J. URB.
L. 645, 654 (1981) (arguing that the interests protected by Title VII are broad, encompassing the
rights to freedom of "harms to conscience," and freedom from both direct and indirect discrimina-
tion in the workplace); N. Morrison Torrey, Indirect Discrimination Under Title VII: Expanding
Male Standing To Sue for Injuries Received as a Result of Employer Discrimination Against
Females, 64 WASH. L. REV. 365, 372-73 (1989) (arguing that by granting a right to sue under
Title VII to "any person claiming to be aggrieved," Congress intended Title VII protection to
encompass anyone injured by discrimination, rather than only those directly discriminated
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the enactment of Title VII appears to confirm such commentary.
b. Legislative history
Title VII represents the culmination of years of fair employment
debate in both the House and the Senate.117 Senator Humphrey, one
of Title VIi's sponsors, indicated that the Act derived its constitu-
tional basis from the Commerce Clause of the United States Consti-
tution. Given this basis, legislators perceived that the Act would
sweep broadly, as illustrated by a number of comments and debates
on the House floor during deliberation on the bill.
First, the legislators debating the proposed bill perceived its broad
scope. During House deliberations on February 8, 1964, a heated
debate transpired between Representative Roosevelt of California
and Representative Williams of Mississippi.11 Representative Wil-
liams proposed an amendment to the House bill that would have
allowed for a greater range of exceptions to employers in making
employment decisions.' 20 Williams expressed concern that, under
the existing bill, the government would be reaching too far into the
realm of private business. 21
Representative Roosevelt, on the other hand, supported the ex-
isting bill under which only limited exceptions were granted to em-
ployers in making hiring decisions based on a protected trait.1 22 He
responded to William's criticism by declaring that the sponsors' in-
tent was, broadly, to break down the barriers to employment that
had unfairly prevented particular classes of persons from obtaining
jobs. 2 3 In summary, Representative Roosevelt stated, "[W]e are
trying to get rid of discrimination in our national life . . -124
Perhaps -the most articulate summary of the aims of Title VII was
against).
117. THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964: WHAT IT MEANS, supra note 24 (indicating that Title
VII derived its basis from the Declaration of Independence, the depression, the crisis of World
War II, and various labor bills of the 1950s, among other sources).
118. 110 CONG. REC. 6328 (1964) (statement of Senator Humphrey) ("The courts have held
time and again that the commerce clause authorizes Congress to enact legislation to regulate
employment which affects interstate and foreign commerce.").
119. Id. at 2563.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. (statement of Rep. Roosevelt) ("So all we are trying to do is to break down this unfor-
tunate idea-this wrong idea-which unfortunately is prevalent in many areas of the country.").
Representative Williams' proposed amendment was defeated by a vote of 108 to 70. Id.
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provided by Representative Cohelan of California during early
House deliberations. Cohelan noted that, while black Americans are
required to meet the same obligations and responsibilities of citizen-
ship as white Americans, they are denied many of the same rights
and privileges enjoyed by white Americans. 2 Representative Cohe-
lan went on to explain that, in response to this injustice, the 1964
Civil Rights Bill would allow the nation to fight more effectively for
racial justice and human equality and "to do what is right. '1 26
While Cohelan admitted that the bill would not solve inequality
in the marketplace, he opined that it would nevertheless go a long
way toward "fulfilling the pledges upon which the nation was
founded-pledges that all men are created equal; that they are en-
dowed equally with inalienable rights; that they are entitled to equal
opportunity in the pursuit of their daily lives."12 7 Representative
Corman of California further responded to the bill's opponents by
confirming their suspicions. He stated that "[tihe opponents of this
measure are accurate when they label it the most far reaching civil
rights bill ever to come before this house."'2 8 So, although propo-
nents and opponents of Title VII disagreed on its merits, both
clearly understood that the reach of the Act would be broad, and
that its purpose was to eradicate employment discrimination in
general. 29
c. Supreme Court interpretation
The Supreme Court acknowledged the broad reach of Title VII in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.' Again, in Griggs, a group of black
employees sued a company under Title VII, alleging discriminatory
hiring and promotion practices. Specifically, the claim alleged that
the employer established arbitrary barriers to advancement by re-
quiring a high school diploma and separate intelligence testing.' 3 '
The plaintiffs claimed that these barriers effectively excluded blacks
from higher paying jobs.13 2 Both the district and appellate courts
found that the plaintiffs failed to provide evidence of discriminatory
125. Id. at 1593 (statement of Rep. Cohelan).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1592 (statement of Rep. Corman).
129. Id.
130. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
131. Id. at 427-28.
132. Id.
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intent. Absent such intent, both courts held that the testing require-
ments were permissible, even if they rendered a disproportionate
number of blacks ineligible for jobs.1"'
Reversing the lower court decision in part, the United States Su-
preme Court held that, although there was no evidence of discrimi-
natory intent, the plaintiffs had stated a valid Title VII claim.134
The Court found that the employer's requirements had effectively
prevented blacks from being promoted and were unrelated to spe-
cific job performance. 135 It reasoned that because the employer had
shown no meaningful relationship between the new requirements
and improved job performance, the practice must be prohibited as
working an invidious discrimination on the black plaintiffs.3 6 Ac-
cording to the Court, Congress intended for Title VII to "remove
the unnecessary barriers that have operated invidiously to discrimi-
nate on various bases."'137
The above discussion thus demonstrates that the statutory lan-
guage of Title VII, its legislative history, and the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Act all confirm its broad aim of eradicating
employment discrimination. Still, not every person seemingly ag-
grieved by a discriminatory act is entitled to have a federal court
decide the merits of his or her Title VII claim. Rather, in order to
have a day in court, a claimant must show some connection between
an employer's discriminatory act and the claimant's resulting injury.
What follows is an overview of standing-one of the doctrines that
guides a court in determining whether it has jurisdiction to decide
the merits of a case.
C. The General Law of Standing
Assuming that a victim of employment discrimination has met the
procedural requirements discussed above and has chosen to sue his
or her employer in federal court, the individual must still meet the
requirements for standing before a court will adjudicate that indi-
133. Id. at 429.
134. Id. at 432.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 431.
137. ld; see also EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 77 (1984) (asserting that "the dominant
purpose of the Title, of course, is to root out discrimination in employment"). The 1991 Civil
Rights Act reaffirmed this intent by codifying the Griggs concept of disparate impact discrimina-
tion, and repudiating the holding of Wards Cove. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A) (1988 &
Supp. II1. 1991).
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vidual's Title VII rights. Standing doctrine requires that a plaintiff
have a distinct basis for invoking the court's jurisdiction. 38 The sec-
ond section of Article III of the United States Constitution confines
the federal court's jurisdiction to "cases or controversies." ' 13 9 This
language forms the basis for the general law of standing that limits
judicial authority' 40
A full history of standing decisions would serve only to convolute
this discussion.'" Furthermore, because standing is generally re-
garded as a modern concept,' 2 only more recent Supreme Court
decisions will be explored to define the doctrine's present contours.
A useful method of understanding this doctrine is to separate it into
three categories; namely, (1) core Constitutional standing require-
138. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969) (holding that plaintiff had standing be-
cause he could demonstrate injury); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968) (stating that "the
question is whether the person whose standing is challenged is a proper party to request
adjudication").
139. Article I1, Section 2, states, "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution, [and] the Laws of the United States . . .to Controversies
to which the United States shall be a Party; [and to Controversies] ... between Citizens of
different States." U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2, cl. 1.
140. The doctrine of standing derives from the Article III "cases or controversies" clause of the
Constitution, but the development of the doctrine is inconsistent. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S.
737, 751 (1984) ("[T]he constitutional component of standing doctrine incorporates concepts con-
cededly not susceptible of precise definition."); see also David A. Logan, Standing To Sue: A
Proposed Separation of Powers Analysis, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 37, 39-40 ("In spite of the large
number of cases that the Supreme Court has decided on standing grounds, the concept unfortu-
nately remains a shifting and elusive one.").
Still, the Supreme Court has interpreted the case or controversy requirement to define for the
judicial branch the concept of separation of powers. Allen, 468 U.S. at 750; Valley Forge Chris-
tian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471-76
(1982). Furthermore, the Court has held that the doctrines that have developed pursuant to the
case or controversy requirement were "'founded in concern about the proper-and properly lim-
ited-role of the courts in a democratic society.' " Id. at 750 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 498 (197.5)). These doctrines have been established to fundamentally limit judicial power
pursuant to the American system of government. Allen, 468 U.S. at 750. The Allen Court indi-
cated that, among these limiting doctrines, standing is "perhaps the most important." Id.
141. For a general discussion of standing law and how this law has been misinterpreted, see
Paul A. Lebel, Standing After Havens Realty: A Critique and an Alternative Framework for
Analysis, 1982 DUKE L.J. 1013; see also Mark V. Tushnet, The Sociology of Article HI: A Re-
sponse to Professor Brilmayer, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1698, 1715 n.72 (1980) (arguing that standing
is prone to manipulation and incoherence); Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the
Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1386-93 (1988) (arguing that standing is a
myth that has unfortunately reshaped our thinking about adjudication).
142. It is believed that Justice Frankfurter was the first to discuss standing as an Article IIl
concept of justiciability. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 464-68 (1939) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring); Winter, supra note 141, at 1371 (claiming that for the first 150 years of the Repub-
lic, the framers were oblivious to the concept that standing was a component of the "cases and
controversies" provision of Article 111).
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ments under Article III, (2) prudential standing barriers imposed by
the courts, and (3) statutory grants of standing by Congress. 1 3
1. Constitutional Standing Requirements
The Supreme Court has interpreted Article III to require that a
plaintiff have a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy to
invoke federal jurisdiction.' 44 This requires the plaintiff to make a
three-fold showing. First, the plaintiff must allege a "distinct and
palpable injury.""' Second, the plaintiff must prove a "fairly trace-
able causal connection between the claimed injury and the chal-
lenged conduct of the defendant."' 4" Third, the plaintiff must show
that there is a "substantial likelihood" that the relief requested will
redress the injury alleged.' 47 This three-fold test is best understood
by looking to its application in some recent cases.
a. The injury-in-fact requirement
First, the standing doctrine requires the plaintiff to prove that he
suffered an injury in fact. 4 ' While it may seem that this would.re-
quire a showing of a direct, tangible injury, the Court found other-
wise in United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency
Procedures ("SCRAP"). 49 In SCRAP, an environmental group
sued to enjoin the Interstate Commerce Commission ("ICC") from
enforcing its order allowing freight carriers to impose a surcharge
on freight rates. 5 ' The Interstate Commerce Act had empowered
the ICC to suspend rate increases sought by railroads pending an
investigation into the lawfulness of the increase. The plaintiffs
claimed that the ICC's failure to suspend rate increases in this case
would cause them "economic, recreational, and aesthetic harm."
They asserted, among other things, that the rate increases would
discourage the transportation of recyclable materials, and would
143. While standing may be best understood under this model, these separate standing catego-
ries often overlap in court opinions. See Allen, 468 U.S. 737 (holding that both abstractness of
injury and failure of the plaintiffs to prove sufficient causation precluded standing).
144. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 78-79 (1978).
145. Id. at 72.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 79. See generally RONALD D. ROTUNDA ET AL,, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 2.13(f)(2) (1986).
148. Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 78-79.
149. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
150. Id.
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thus burden their aesthetic enjoyment of the outdoor
environment.""
In perhaps the most liberal interpretation of injury in the history
of the Supreme Court,'52 the Court found that the plaintiffs had
standing to bring their claim. 53 First, the Court held that the plain-
tiffs claimed a real injury. It reasoned that they were harmed in
their enjoyment of the country's natural resources by the adverse
environmental impact of the increased freight rates.'
While the Court noted that all persons who utilize the scenic re-
sources of the country could claim a similar harm, it reasoned that
standing could not be denied simply because "many people suffer
the same injury.""' Furthermore, the Court stated that injury was
not limited merely to economic harm, but extended to "'aesthetic
and environmental well-being.' "I" Because the evidence thus con-
formed to the Court's definition of injury, and because the plaintiffs
also met the causation and redressability prongs of the standing test,
the Court held that the plaintiffs' claim was justiciable. 57 Thus,
while tangible injuries may be easier to prove, a plaintiff may satisfy
the injury-in-fact requirement by asserting an intangible injury.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court recently clarified that injury-in-
fact requires more than a mere injury to a cognizable interest. In
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, a group of wildlife conservationists
sought to extend the coverage of endangered species protection past
the United States borders. 158 The Court held that, although the
151. Id. at 676.
152. KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 22.02-2, at 489 (1976)
(arguing that SCRAP represented "an all-time high in Supreme Court liberality on the subject of
standing").
153. SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 687-88.
154. Id. at 686.
155. Id. at 687. The Court distinguished the claimed injuries here from those claimed in Sierra
Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). In Sierra Club, the plaintiff claimed that aesthetic and
recreational values of the area would be lessened by certain commercial development, but it failed
to allege that it or its members would be negatively impacted in their activities by the develop-
ment. Id. at 735-36. In SCRAP, on the other hand, the Court found that the plaintiffs sufficiently
alleged that they were adversely impacted in their enjoyment of natural resources, pursuant to the
Commerce Commission's failure to suspend freight rate surcharges and the subsequent disuse of
recyclable goods. SCRAP. 412 U.S. at 687.
156. SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 686 (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972)).
157. Id. at 686-87.
158. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 60 U.S.L.W. 4495 (U.S. June 12, 1992). The plaintiff
sought to ensure that any actions authorized or funded by federal agencies would not endanger a
threatened species not only in the United States, but in other countries as well. It argued that a
failure by the Secretary of the Interior to promulgate rules extending endangered species protec-
tion would increase the threat of extinction; such threat negatively impacting the ability to observe
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plaintiffs undeniably had a cognizable interest in their desire to ben-
efit from the preservation of animals, injury for standing requires
that the party seeking review actually be among the injured, and
that a mere speculation of injury would not suffice. 15 9
b. The causation requirement
The doctrine of standing also requires that the plaintiff prove a
causal connection between the alleged injury and the defendant's
act or omission. In Allen v. Wright, 6 ' the Court addressed this re-
quirement. In Allen, parents of black school children brought a* class
action suit in federal court. The plaintiffs alleged that the IRS had
failed to fulfill its obligation to deny tax-exempt status to discrimi-
natory private schools.' They claimed that this failure encouraged
the expansion of racially segregated private schools to the detriment
of public school education. As a result, the parents asserted, their
children were deprived of an integrated education, and they were
harmed directly by the IRS failure." 2
After assuming that the plaintiffs had claimed a real injury, the
Court nevertheless found that the plaintiffs lacked standing because
they had not proven a sufficient causal connection between the IRS
failure and segregation of schools. 6 ' According to the Court, the
plaintiffs had failed to prove specifically that deficient tax exemption
enforcement directly contributed to the segregation of the schools. It
reasoned that the conclusory comments by the plaintiffs in this re-
gard were unsupported and speculative.1'" The Court thus refused to
decide the merits of the claim.'6 5 The Allen holding indicates that a
clear, causal link between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's
and study those species. Id.
159. Id. The Court clearly rejected the plaintiffs' broad standing plea based upon loss of aes-
thetic rights. It stated that "[ilt goes beyond the limit, however, and into pure speculation and
fantasy, to say that-anyone who observes or works with an endangered species, anywhere in the
world, is appreciably harmed by a single project affecting some portion of that species with which
he has no more specific connection." Id. at 4498-99.
160. 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
161. Id. at 739.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 759.
164. Id. at 756-61. Essentially, the Court reasoned that, even if it were to decide for the plain-
tiffs on the merits of the case and enjoined the IRS from failing to enforce the tax exemption
rules, there was an uncertain likelihood that this would remedy segregation. Id. In this sense, the
causal connection and the redressability prongs of the standing requirement can be seen as oppo-
site sides of the same coin.
165. Id.
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alleged injury must be shown before the Court's jurisdiction will be
invoked.
c. The redressability requirement
Finally, the standing doctrine requires that the relief sought be
substantially likely to redress the plaintiff's alleged injury.1"" In
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc.,"6 7
the Court held that its power to declare an act unconstitutional sat-
isfied the redressability requirement for standing. In Duke Power,
an environmental organization, a labor union, and a number of indi-
viduals living near nuclear power plants sued the Nuclear Regula-
tory Commission and a public utility that was constructing and
maintaining the plants. 168 The plaintiffs claimed that they were in-
jured by pollution emanating from the nuclear plant in question.'6 "
They further alleged that the Price-Anderson Act enabled the utility
to construct and maintain these plants to their detriment. 70 The
plaintiffs sought a declaration that the Price-Anderson Act"' was
unconstitutional on the basis of the Due Process and Equal Protec-
tion Clauses of the Fifth Amendment.
The Price-Anderson Act was created with the dual purpose of
protecting the public in the event of a nuclear accident and encour-
aging development in the nuclear energy industry.' 7 2 It imposed a
monetary limit on owner liability for nuclear accidents resulting
from the operation of federally licensed private nuclear power
plants. 173 In addition, the Act required that such plants waive all
legal defenses in exchange for this indemnification, and provided
Congress with authority to take additional measures in the event of
an accident. 74
The Court first held that the plaintiffs met the injury-in-fact re-
quirement for standing. They had alleged immediate harm as a re-
sult of pollution.' 75 Second, the Court found a clear causal connec-
166. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 79 (1978).
167. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
168. Id. at 67.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 76-78.
171. 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1988).
172. Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 64, 65.
173. Id.
174. Id. The Act established a $560 million liability limit. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(c)(1988).
175. Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 81.
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tion between the provisions of the Act, which enabled the defendant
to construct and maintain nuclear plants, and the alleged harm done
to the plaintiffs. 76 Finally, because the plaintiffs sought declaration
of the Act's unconstitutionality, the Court held that this relief would
effectively redress their alleged injuries. 177 The Court thus found
that the plaintiffs had standing to bring their claim.'17  The redres-
sability prong of standing therefore requires that judicial interven-
tion be able to remedy the plaintiff's alleged injury.
The preceding analysis suggests that, once a plaintiff has met the
three requirements for constitutional standing, the merits of the
claim may be heard. However, the Court has occasionally denied
standing to plaintiffs who met these constitutional requirements. In
such cases, the policy of judicial restraint has led the court to apply
additional barriers to standing.' 79
2. Prudential Barriers to Standing
Although the reasons proffered are anything but uniform,8 0 the
Court has sometimes fashioned procedural standing requirements in
addition to the constitutional requirements for standing. For exam-
ple, the following cases illustrate that generally the Court will im-
pose prudential barriers to standing where the plaintiff has failed to
assert a sufficiently specific harm.
The Supreme Court found that an injury claim was too abstract
and thus nonjusticiable in Schlesinger v. Reservist's Committee to
Stop the War.'" In Schlesinger, the Court was faced with a chal-
lenge to the armed forces reserve status of certain members of Con-
176. Id.
177. Id. The Court reasoned that, because Duke Power had relied on the indemnification pro-
vided by the Act to build and maintain plants, a declaration of the Act's unconstitutionality would
preclude further construction and maintenance of the plants, and would thus remedy the plaintiffs'
injuries. Id. at 81 n.26.
178. Id. at 81. The Court nevertheless denied the remedy sought by the plaintiffs on the merits
of the case. In doing so, it held that the Act did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Id.
179. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-52 (1984) (pointing out that the issue of standing
presents questions that must be answered with regard to the Article III notion that federal courts
are to exercise power only in the last resort, only when adjudication is consistent with a system of
separated powers, and only when the dispute is capable of resolution via the judicial process).
180. See DAVIS, supra note 152, § 2.21, at 523 (addressing standing as a decisional tool used by
the courts to avoid deciding difficult cases, and arguing that the law of standing is the wrong tool
for this purpose); Logan, supra note 140, at 37 (arguing that the courts should use prudential
barriers to deny standing to parties alleging amorphous grievances).
181. 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
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gress when an association of present and former members of the
armed forces reserves brought a class action suit on behalf of all
United States citizens and taxpayers. 182 The plaintiff association
sued the Secretary of Defense for violating the Incompatibility
Clause 8 ' of the United States Constitution by allowing certain
members of Congress to remain members of the armed forces
reserves. 84 The plaintiff claimed that the members of Congress who
were also reservists were effectively unable to render objective ser-
vice to their constituents.1 85 The association claimed that it was in-
jured as a result of this legislative failure, and it sought injunctive
relief and an order directing the Secretary of Defense to discharge
all House members from the reserves. 8 '
Under a strict constitutional standing analysis, theplaintiff argua-
bly would have established the requisite elements. First, it claimed a
distinct injury in not being accorded fair representation by its
elected officials.' 8 7 Second, this injury was fairly traceable to the
alleged conduct of the defendant.' Third, the injury was
redressable by the court; an injunction would have remedied the
plaintiff's injury.' 89
Nevertheless, the Court denied the plaintiff standing both as a
class of citizens and as a class of taxpayers. 9 As a class of taxpay-
ers, the Court held that the plaintiff had failed to establish the re-
quired nexus between its taxpayer status and its claim before the
Court. " As a class of citizens, the Court held that the association's
182. Id. at 209.
183. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 6, cl. 2. This clause states, "[N]o Person holding any Office under
the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office." Id.
184. Schlesinger, 418 U.S. 208.
185. Id. at 212. The plaintiffs opposed the war and essentially claimed that congressmen who
were also reservists could not impartially exercise their legislative duties. The plaintiffs therefore
claimed that they were injured by being deprived objective governance. Id.
186. Id. at 211.
187. Id. at 212. The plaintiff alleged that congressmen's reserve status imposed inconsistent
obligations which could cause them to violate their duty faithfully to perform either as congress-
men or as reservists. This was said to deprive citizens and taxpayers of the right to faithful dis-
charge of duties by elected congressmen. Id.
188. The injury was said to have been suffered because of the congressmen's conflicting duties.
Id.
189. Id. at 211. Among other relief sought, the plaintiff sought a declaration that membership
in the reserves was prohibited to members of Congress by Art. I, § 6, cl. 2, and incompatible with
membership in Congress. Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 211.
190. Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 227-28.
191. Id. Standing in taxpayer suits represents an entirely different analysis that is beyond the
scope of this Comment. Courts generally undertake an analysis similar to that undertaken in non-
taxpayer suits, but add a "logical nexus" requirement as illustrated in Flast v. Cohen 392 U.S. 83
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claim of injury was too abstract. 192 The Court indicated that it was
not within a federal court's limited jurisdiction to "resolve abstract
questions."'9 3 Thus, even though the plaintiff met the constitutional
standing requirements, prudential barriers prevented adjudication
on the merits of its claim.
One year later the Court applied the prudential standing rule that
bars litigants from asserting the legal rights of others. In Warth v.
Seldin,194 various not-for-profit organizations with an interest in al-
leviating housing shortages, individual taxpayers, and individual
low- and moderate-income minority citizens sued a town and mem-
bers of the town's zoning, planning, and town boards.' 95 The plain-
tiffs claimed that the town's zoning ordinance effectively excluded
persons of low income from living in the town, in contravention of
certain constitutional and civil rights.' 96 They sought damages as
well as injunctive and declaratory relief.' 7
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' denial of standing
to all plaintiffs. After dismissing the low-income plaintiffs' standing
for traditional constitutional reasons,'98 the Court went on to ad-
dress the standing of the taxpayer class of plaintiffs. First, the Court
found that this class failed to meet the causal relation prong of the
constitutional standing doctrine.'99 It found that there was not a suf-
ficient causal connection between the defendant's alleged zoning
conduct and the increased taxes in the neighboring communities to
(1968). In Flast, the Court held that to have standing a taxpayer had to establish a logical nexus
between his status as a taxpayer and the claim sought to be adjudicated. The Court explained that
this nexus requirement was seemingly to bar an endless number of taxpayers from suing the gov-
ernment based merely on regulatory expenditures which do not impact the taxpayer's constitu-
tional rights. Id. at 91-94.
192. Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 223.
193. Id.
194. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
195. Id. at 494.
196. Id. at 493. The plaintiffs alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (establishing the statutory
right to equal rights under the law), 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (extending the same real and personal
property rights enjoyed by white persons to all citizens of the United States), 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(granting civil remedies to persons deprived of equal constitutional or statutory privileges). They
claimed that requirements for lot size, setback, and floor area combined to disfavor the construc-
tion of low- to moderate-income housing. Warth, 422 U.S. at 493.
197. Warth, 422 U.S. at 496.
198. Id. at 502-08. These plaintiffs alleged that they had attempted to procure housing in the
town but were unsuccessful in their attempts due to the costs involved. Nevertheless, the Court
found that their complaints in no way tied the high costs to the town's zoning ordinances. Further-
more, the Court found that the plaintiffs were merely speculating when they asserted that, by
striking down the ordinance, they would be successful in procuring housing. Id.
199. Id. at 509.
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which this class belonged."'0
Furthermore, the Court rejected the taxpayer class's standing on
a prudential basis. It held that the taxpayer class could not base
standing on the legal rights of those who may have been directly
impacted by the defendant's zoning laws.20 1 Such a claim, the Court
said, fell "squarely within the prudential standing rule that normally
bars litigants from asserting the legal rights or legal interests of
others in order to obtain relief from injury to themselves."20 2 The
taxpayer class failed to allege that it suffered specific and direct
harm. Therefore, it could not directly benefit from the court's inter-
vention in this dispute.20 3
Finally, the Court addressed the standing of the not-for-profit or-
ganization that asserted an interest in promoting and encouraging
low- and moderate-income housing for its members.0 4 The organi-
zation specifically claimed that its members were denied the benefit
of interracial living by virtue of the defendant's zoning laws. The
Court held that, even if this injury met Article III's case or contro-
versy requirements, "prudential considerations strongly counsel
against according [the organization] standing to prosecute this ac-
tion. 205 In essence, the Court was unwilling to grant standing be-
cause the organization was attempting to litigate the rights of third
parties while failing to allege specific statutory injury to those third
parties or to itself.20 6
In both Schlesinger and Warth the Court imposed prudential bar-
riers that barred the plaintiffs' standing and prevented adjudication
200. Id. The taxpayers alleged that the defendant's zoning laws produced insufficient low-in-
come housing, that their town (which bordered that of the defendant) was forced to erect excess
low-income housing because of this, and that, as a result, their property taxes increased. Id. at
508-09.
201. Id. at 509.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 510.
204. Id. at 511. The Court quickly dismissed this group's claim of standing based on its status
as a taxpayer and on behalf of persons of low and moderate income generally. However, the
organization also alleged standing on the basis that nine percent of its membership actually re-
sided in the defendant town. It claimed that, as a result of the defendant's zoning laws, these
members were deprived of the benefits of living in an ethnically and racially integrated commu-
nity. This claim resulted in the invocation of prudential principles to bar standing for the group.
Id, at 513-14.
205. Id. at 514.
206. Id. at 513-14. The Court distinguished Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,
409 U.S. 205 (1972), by noting that the plaintiff there asserted a statutory injury while the plain-
tiffs here failed to do so, Warth, 422 U.S. at 513 n.21.
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on the merits. In Schlesinger,20 7 the Court refused to reach the mer-
its of an abstract matter, while in Warth20 8 the Court refused to
address third-party claims absent some statutory direction that it do
SO. 2 °' Nevertheless, the Warth Court explained that the prudential
barriers that preclude standing in some instances may not be appli-
cable in others.21 0
3. Statutory Standing
The decision in Warth indicated that Congress may remove pru-
dential barriers to standing by statute.211 This means that Congress
may create a statutory right, the deprivation of which automatically
confers standing upon the aggrieved individual. In such cases, the
Court will apply the core constitutional standing doctrine, but it will
not apply prudential standing principles to bar adjudication of the
merits.212 The following case illustrates the Court's standing analy-
sis where the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a statutory
right, and where the statute itself establishes a standing clause.
The Court refused to apply prudential barriers, and it granted
standing based on intangible injuries in Trafficante v. Metropolitan
Life Insurance Corp."' In Trafficante, the Court was faced with a
housing discrimination claim brought separately by one black and
one white tenant of a large housing complex against the landlord of
the complex. Each alleged that the landlord's rental policy was ra-
cially discriminatory in violation of the Fair Housing Act.21 4 Fur-
thermore, each alleged specific injury as a result of this discrimina-
tion.2"a Both claimed loss of the social benefits from living in an
integrated community, loss of professional advantages available
from integrated living, embarrassment, and economic damage from
racial stigmatization.216 The Court unanimously granted both plain-
207. Schlesinger v. Reservist's Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
208. Warth, 422 U.S. 490.
209. Id. at 513-14.
210. Id. at 514.
211. Id. at 509.
212. Id. at 514 (citing Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1972)). The Court
stated, "Congress may create a statutory right or entitlement, the alleged deprivation of which can
confer standing to sue even where the plaintiff would have suffered no judicially cognizable injury
in the absence of the statute." Id.
213. 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
214. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1988).
215. Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 208-09.
216. Id. at 208.
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tiffs standing to sue.2"7 It held that such standing was invoked by
virtue of a real case or controversy and a real injury in "loss of
important benefits from interracial association. 218 Furthermore it
held that this injury was attributable to the defendant's alleged dis-
criminatory conduct, 19 and that the injury was redressable.220 The
Court thus applied a constitutional standing doctrine, and failed to
impose separate prudential barriers.221
The language of the Fair Housing Act proved crucial for the
Court in its standing analysis.222 The statute clearly granted the
right to make a claim to "the person aggrieved."22 Citing the Third
Circuit's interpretation of similar jurisdictional language in another
civil rights statute,224 the Court concluded that this language re-
flected "a congressional intention to define standing as broadly as is
permitted by Article 1II of the Constitution. 225
Trafficante is one of a number of cases within the fair housing
arena that addresses standing. 226 For a number of reasons, fair
217. Id. at 212.
218. Id. at 210.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 209-10.
223. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a) (1988).
224. The Court cited Hackett v. McGuire Bros., Inc., 445 F.2d 442 (3d Cir. 1971), a Title VII
case in which the Third Circuit found the statutory language, "the person aggrieved," to convey a
congressional intent for broad standing. Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 209.
225. Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 209 (citing Hackett v. McGuire Bros., Inc., 445 F.2d 442, 446
(3d Cir. 1971)). The Trafficante holding is important with regard to Title VII tester standing in
at least two respects. First, the case establishes that the Court will look to statutory language to
determine if legislators explicitly addressed the standing issue. Id. If certain language confers
standing on the aggrieved party, Trafficante seems to hold that the Court will defer to congres-
sional intent and will not apply separate prudential barriers to standing. But see Simon v. Eastern
Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41 n.22 (1976) (stating that "when Congress has so acted,
the requirements of Article Ill remain: 'the plaintiff still must allege a distinct and palpable injury
to himself, even if it is an injury shared by a large class of other possible litigants' " (quoting
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975))).
Second, Trafficante provides precedent for indirect standing in the civil rights context. While
the white plaintiff was not the direct object of the defendant's discriminatory conduct, the Court
nevertheless found that he was aggrieved. Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 209. Essentially, the Court
looked to the Fair Housing Act and determined that the Act was not intended to protect only
minorities. Rather, the Court found that the Act was also intended, broadly, to protect the entire
community from housing discrimination. Id. at 211.
Proponents of amendments to the Title VII legislation then at issue also emphasized that those
who were not the direct objects of discrimination still had an interest in fair housing. See Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Urban Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 1358, 2114, 2280 (1967).
226. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982); Gladstone Realtors v. Village of
1250
TITLE VII TESTER STANDING
housing litigation, particularly within the Title VIII context, serves
as a useful comparison to tester standing under Title VII. Both Title
VII and Title VIII are civil rights acts and both contain similar
jurisdictional language.227 Perhaps most importantly, the Supreme
Court has addressed the issue of tester standing under Title VIII. 228
For these reasons, a brief overview of Title VIII, followed by an
analysis of some specific Title VIII cases involving testers is
appropriate.
D. Title VIII and Tester Standing
Title VilI of the Civil Rights Act of 1968,229 commonly known as
the Fair Housing Act, was enacted to provide equal housing oppor-
tunities throughout the country.23 0 Consistent with this purpose, the
Act proscribes discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin in the sale or lease of any dwelling. 23' Specifi-
cally, the Act makes it unlawful to fail to negotiate over the sale or
rental of dwellings, ,to advertise discriminatorily with regard to the
sale or rental of dwellings, or to misrepresent the availability of a
dwelling for sale or rent, on the basis of any of the protected
traits. 23 2 Similar to Title VII, the Act exempts certain religious and
private organizations from coverage,233 and it vests responsibility for
administration of the Act in a governmental agency.234
The Act is directed toward protecting any "person aggrieved" by
a discriminatory housing practice.235 The Court has emphasized this
specific language when assessing a claimant's standing to sue under
Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979).
227. See infra notes 299-303 and accompanying text.
228. Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 363.
229. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1988).
230. Id. § 3601.
231. Id. § 3604.
232. Id. This section also proscribes individuals from inducing any person to sell or rent dwell-
ings on the basis of representations regarding entry into the neighborhood of persons possessing
any of the protected traits.'Id. § 3604(e). Furthermore, the Act proscribes discrimination in the
financing of housing by banks and other creditors, and proscribes discriminatory bars to member-
ship in real estate brokerage services. Id. §§ 3605-3606.
233. Id. § 3607.
234. Id. § 3608. Responsibility for administering the Act is vested in the Secretary of Housing
and Urban Development. Id.
235. Id. § 3610(a). This section states, "Any person who claims to have been injured by a
discriminatory housing practice or who believes that he will be irrevocably injured by a discrimi-'
natory housing practice that is about to occur (hereafter 'person aggrieved') may file a complaint
with the Secretary." Id.
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the Act. As the following cases. illustrate, the Court's interpretation
of this provision has provided standing to claimants that may not
have had standing under the prudential barriers imposed in Warth
and Schlesinger.
The Court established that only the constitutional doctrine should
be applied to assess standing in Title VIII actions in Gladstone v.
Village of Bellwood.2 36 There, the conduct of a real estate broker-
age firm was the subject of a fair housing suit. A village and six
individuals (two black and four white), acting as testers, brought
Title VIII claims against two real estate brokers and certain em-
ployees of the brokers. The plaintiffs alleged that the brokers had
engaged in racial steering,237 and that they had injured the village
by manipulating its housing market to the detriment of its resi-
dents.2 38 Furthermore, it was asserted that the brokers injured the
individual plaintiffs by denying them the benefits of living in an in-
tegrated society. The plaintiffs sought monetary, injunctive, and de-
claratory relief under the Fair Housing Act.2" '
The Court first addressed the statutory construction of the Act.24
It concluded that Congress clearly intended standing under Title
VIII to extend to the limits permitted by Article III of the United
States Constitution."" Because of this congressional intent, the
Court found that it was inappropriate to erect prudential barriers to
standing.2"2 It thus assessed the case under the constitutional stand-
ing doctrine alone.243
Similar to its decision in Trafficante,24" the Court found that the
loss of benefits of living in an integrated community constituted a
sufficiently palpable injury to satisfy the first prong of the constitu-
tional standing requirement.24 ' Furthermore, the plaintiffs met the
causation requirement, as their alleged injury resulted from the de-
fendant's discriminatory conduct.248 While the Court did not decide
236. 441 U.S. 91 (1979).
237. "Steering" is the practice of "directing prospective home buyers interested in equivalent
properties to different areas according to their race." Id. at 94.
238. Id. at 95.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 100-04.
241. Id. at 103-04.
242. Id. at 103.
243. Id. at 100.
244. Traflicante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
245. Gladstone, 441 U.S. at I 10-1 I.
246. Id. at 113-14.
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specifically on the tester standing issue,241 it established that stand-
ing in Title VIII actions should be assessed under the constitutional
standing doctrine, and not under a further prudential analysis. 24 8 It
affirmed the appellate court's remand for a determination by the
trial court on the merits of the plaintiff's claim.24
Nevertheless, the Court demonstrated an unwillingness to cate-
gorically extend standing to all plaintiffs alleging the loss of benefits
of interracial association in Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman.250 In
Havens Realty, a civil rights group and two individuals (one black
and one white) employed as testers by the group sued the owner of
an apartment complex under Title VIII.251 The plaintiffs alleged
that the owner had engaged in racial steering practices and had de-
prived them of the benefits of interracial association.252 They sought
monetary, injunctive, and declaratory relief.15 3
With regard to the individual plaintiffs, the Court separated its
standing analysis into three parts. First, it held that the black plain-
tiff had standing to sue in her capacity as a tester.2"4 Having re-
ceived false information concerning the availability of an apartment,
her right to truthful housing information had been abridged. This
constituted a specific injury according to the Court. 55
However, the Court denied standing to the white plaintiff in his
capacity as a tester.256 Since the landlord had correctly informed
this individual that apartments were available, his right to truthful
housing information had not been abridged. The Court reasoned
that, absent the receipt of untruthful information, this plaintiff
could claim no specific injury in his tester capacity. 257
Finally, the Court addressed the assertion by all the plaintiffs that
they should be granted standing on the basis of being deprived the
benefits of interracial association.258 The Court held that the apart-
247. Id. at Ill. The individual plaintiffs failed to press their standing as testers on appeal.
Rather, they asserted standing on the basis of indirect injury in being denied interracial benefits.
Id.
248. Id. at 115.
249. Id. at 116.
250. 455 U.S. 363 (1982).
251. Id. at 366 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1988).
252. Havens Realty. 455 U.S. at 366.
253. Id. at 367.
254. Id. at 374.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 375.
257. Id.
258. Id.
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ment owner's alleged discriminatory conduct was unlikely to have
palpable effects throughout a large enough geographic area to truly
deprive the plaintiffs of interracial association. 59 It thus reasoned
that, absent a more clearly defined and specific claim of injury,
standing could not be granted on this basis.2 '0
Havens Realty and Gladstone thus establish some important rules
for standing in the Title VIII context. First, courts will look to the
language of the statute to determine whether standing is ad-
dressed.2"' However, even after a court concludes that a statutory
right has been created, it will apply the constitutional standing doc-
trine. 2  Second, whether the plaintiff asserts standing as a tester or
as a member of the community, courts will only decide the merits of
cases in which they can truly remedy the plaintiff's injury, consis-
tent with the constitutional standing doctrine.263 These rules apply
equally to Title VII claims.
E. Standing Under Title VII
Though the courts, subsequent to the EEOC's recent endorsement
of Title VII testers, have neither advocated nor rejected tester
standing in the Title VII context,26 4 they have addressed the general
issue of standing under Title VII.P 5 Standing represents a barrier
that all Title VII plaintiffs must overcome to have their claims adju-
dicated.2 6 Beyond this generality, certain Title VII cases reflect the
courts' approach to specific standing issues that are useful to an in-
formed discussion of tester standing.
First, similar to Title VIII actions, courts look to the language of
Title VII to determine the proper scope of standing. In Hackett v.
McGuire Bros., Inc.,2"7 a minority pensioner sued his former em-
259. Id. at 377.
260. Id. at 377-78 (remanding to allow the plaintiffs the opportunity to redraft their complaint
with more specific allegations of injury).
261. Havens Realty, 455 U.S. 363; Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91
(1979).
262. Havens, 445 U.S. 363.
263. Id. For a detailed discussion of Title Vill jurisprudence and its relationship with Title VII
jurisprudence, see Mark W. Zimmerman, Note, Opening the Door to Race-Based Real Estate
Marketing: South-Suburban Housing Center v. Greater South Suburban Board of Realtors, 41
DEPAUL L. REV. 1271 (1992).
264. This is not surprising given the fact that the EEOC announced its endorsement of tester
claims in December of 1990. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
265. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988).
266. See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
267. 445 F.2d 442 (3d Cir. 1971).
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ployer and labor union for discrimination in violation of Title VII.
The plaintiff alleged that while he was employed by the defendant,
he was subjected to intimidation and harassment, and that his work-
ing conditions were adversely effected, solely on the basis of his
race.2"' He further alleged that the union, of which he was a mem-
ber in good standing, failed to protect him and acquiesced in his
discharge because of his race. The plaintiff sought reinstatement
with backpay and other seniority rights, money damages against
both defendants, and injunctive relief from further intimidation and
harassment.269
Although the plaintiff filed a timely complaint, the EEOC found
no reasonable cause for the charge and so notified the plaintiff.
2 70
Thereafter, the plaintiff commenced his own suit in federal court.
The district court dismissed the suit on the ground that, among
other things, the plaintiff was a pensioner and thus not an employee
within the meaning of Title VII.271 The plaintiff then appealed this
decision.272
The Third Circuit reversed the district court's finding with regard
to the plaintiff's standing. The court found that the definition of em-
ployee in the Act, 273 which the district court had relied on for its
standing decision, was not intended to address the standing question
at all. Rather, the appellate court looked to the remedies provision
of Title VII.2 74 It found that this section spoke more directly to the
issue of standing. 275
The court held that the "use in [the remedies provision of Title
VII] of the language 'a person claiming to be aggrieved' shows a
congressional intent to define standing as broadly as is permitted by
Article III of the Constitution. ' 27 Therefore, even though the plain-
tiff was not a current employee, the court found that he was injured
as a result of the defendant's allegedly discriminatory conduct.277
According to the court, by defining standing within the Act, Con-
268. Id. at 444.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 445.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 443.
273. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1988) (defining an employee as "an individual employed by an
employer").
274. Id. § 2000e-5(b) (granting the right to sue to "a person claiming to be aggrieved").
275. Hackett, 445 F.2d at 446.
276. Id.
277. Id.
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gress meant to impose federal court jurisdiction whenever a plaintiff
claimed an injury that was meant to be protected by the Act. As a
result, the court found it unnecessary to impose prudential barriers
to adjudication, and it granted the plaintiff standing to sue.278
As noted previously, the Supreme Court approvingly cited the
Hackett interpretation of Title VIl's standing language in Traf-
ficante.2 71 In Trafficante, the Court found that Congress's use of ju-
risdictional language in the statute aimed to grant standing to those
meeting the constitutional standing requirements. 80 Other courts
have also interpreted the remedies provision of Title VII broadly. 81
Nevertheless, even though courts have refused to apply prudential
barriers to standing in view of Title VII's jurisdictional language, a
separate standing doctrine is evident from Title VII case law. In
numerous cases, courts have required that the plaintiff reside within
the "zone of interest" meant to be protected by the statute.28 2 This
doctrine is best explained in the context of a few cases.
In Patee v. Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Co.283 a group of
male employees sued their employer under Title VII.284 The plain-
tiffs worked within a department made up predominantly of women.
They alleged that, as part of this predominantly female department,
they received lower wages than males working in a different depart-
ment, but performing the same functions. They asserted that this
discrepancy was a direct result of the employer's sex
discrimination .85
The court refused to grant the plaintiffs standing.288 It held that
278. Id. The court went on to explain its rejection of additional prudential barriers to standing
and stated,
The national public policy reflected ...in Title VII ...may not be frustrated by
the development of overly technical judicial doctrines of standing . . . .[I]f the plain-
tiff is sufficiently aggrieved so that he claims enough injury in fact to present a genu-
ine case or controversy in the Article III sense, then he should have standing to sue.
Id. at 446-47.
279. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972); see supra notes 181-98
and accompanying text.
280. Trafficante, 409 U.S. 205.
281. See Stewart v. Hannon, 675 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1982) (en banc); EEOC v. Mississippi
College, 626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981); EEOC v. Bailey Co.,
563 F.2d 439 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 915 (1978).
282. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); Patee v.
Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 803 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1986).
283. 803 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1986).
284. Id. at 477.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 479.
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the male employee's alleged injury did not fall within the zone of
interest to be protected by the statute. Even if their female cowork-
ers could conceivably frame a Title VII claim, the court found that
this should not allow the plaintiffs to "bootstrap" their grievances
into an employment discrimination claim. 87 According to the court,
the plaintiffs were denied standing because the Act was not intended
to protect them as members of the majority; rather, Title Vii's aim
was to equalize opportunities for members of one of the protected
classes." a
However, application of the zone of interest doctrine will not al-
ways bar standing to plaintiffs alleging an injury that results from a
discriminatory work environment. In Clayton v. White Hall School
District,"'9 a white woman employed as a cafeteria manager by a
school district sued that district under Title VII. 90 The woman al-
leged that the district's implementation of a policy requiring district
residence as a prerequisite for enrollment of children in district
schools was racially motivated. 91
287. Id. at 478. For further definition of the zone of interest doctrine, see Data Processing
Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
288. Patee, 803 F.2d at 478-79. The Supreme Court framed the zone of interest test as a
question of whether "the interest sought to be protected by the complaint is arguably within the
zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in ques-
tion." Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153.
In Data Processing, the plaintiffs, providers of data processing services to other businesses, chal-
lenged a ruling by the Comptroller of the Currency. The comptroller's ruling allowed national
banks to make their data processing services available to other banks, incident to correspondent
banking services. The plaintiffs claimed direct economic injury as a result of this ruling as they
suffered a significant competitive disadvantage and a drop in business. The Court held that the
plaintiffs, as competitors harmed by the comptroller's ruling, were within the zone of interests
protected by section 4 of the Bank Service Corporation Act, a statute that precluded data process-
ing services by bank service corporations. Because of their position, they were accorded standing
to sue. Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 158.
The zone of interest test may prove crucial for testers in Title VII actions. The issue is whether
persons merely testing job discrimination are within the zone of interest meant to be protected by
Title VII. The answer will depend upon the courts' response to the legislative and executive en-
dorsements of testers that arguably place testers within this zone.
289. 875 F.2d 676 (8th Cir. 1989).
290. Id. at 678.
291. Id. Apparently the residence policy had existed for years, but the district had failed to
enforce it until the 1983 school year. In that year, a black janitor employed by the school district
but residing outside the district's boundaries, sought to enroll his child in the district's school. The
district applied its previously dormant residence policy to deny enrollment to the janitor's child.
Id. Thereafter, it was forced to rigidly apply this policy to preclude claims of direct racial discrim-
ination, and the plaintiff, a nonresident of the district, was forced to remove her child from the
district school. Besides the direct injury of having to interrupt her child's schooling, the plaintiff
claimed that the district's underlying racial motivation for implementing the long-dormant resi-
dency requirement created a hostile working environment permeated by racial discrimination. Id.
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The appellate court began by affirming the constitutional standing
analysis applied by other courts in similar contexts.2 92 First, it held
that the plaintiff met the core test because she alleged a real injury,
the injury was a result of the defendant's conduct, and the injury
was redressable by the court. 293 Next, the court affirmed the zone of
interest test applied by other courts.2 94 Unlike the court in Patee,29
however, this court held that a hostile working environment was
within the zone of interest meant to be protected by Title VII.296
Because the plaintiff alleged a real injury that the Act sought to
prevent, the court granted her standing.297 The court thus included
an individual indirectly aggrieved by discriminatory conduct in the
zone of interest meant to be protected by Title VII. 298
As the preceding discussion has shown, there exists a clash be-
tween the broad standing aims of Title VII and the narrowing aims
of the federal standing doctrine. While Title VII aims to grant any-
one claiming to be aggrieved the opportunity to sue, standing doc-
trine acts to limit this opportunity by imposing certain constitutional
and prudential rules to bar adjudication. This conflict comes to a
head where testers are concerned. If strict standing rules control,
Title VII testers may not possess the credentials that courts have
required for adjudication. If Title VII aims control, testers would
appear to be aggrieved parties, and could therefore seek relief from
the courts. The question thus becomes Which of the conflicting poli-
cies should control, and why?
II. ANALYSIS
Although no court has addressed in recent times the issue of the
Essentially, the plaintiff claimed that the racial discrimination that was aimed at her minority
coworker negatively impacted the conditions of her employment as well. ld.
292. Id. at 679. The court cited approvingly from United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669
(1973), in which the Court enumerated a two-pronged test for standing: (1) injury in fact, and (2)
injury within the zone of interest of the statute.
293. Clayton, 875 F.2d at 678.
294. Id. at 679-80. Again, the court looked to the Supreme Court's reasoning in SCRAP.
295. Patee v. Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 803 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1986).
296. Clayton, 875 F.2d at 679-80. The court looked to EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 77
(1984) (stating that the "dominant purpose of [Title VII] . . . is to root out discrimination in
employment"), and to Parham v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 433 F.2d 421, 425 (8th Cir.
1970) (holding that Title VII is to be accorded a liberal construction in order to carry out Con-
gress' purpose of eliminating discrimination). Clayton, 875 F.2d at 679-80.
297. Clayton. 875 F.2d at 680.
298. Again, courts have yet to address whether testers rightfully fall within the zone of interest
meant to be protected by Title VII.
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standing of Title VII testers, one may draw upon the Supreme
Court's approach to Title VIII testers to determine how the lower
courts may react to initial Title VII tester claims. More impor-
tantly, by assessing the policies underlying both Title VII and the
federal standing doctrine, one may draw a reasoned conclusion as to
how the courts should react to Title VII testers. Such a conclusion
supports tester standing in Title VII actions.
A. The Title VIII Analogy
The use of testers in the Title VIII context provides a useful anal-
ogy to the issue of tester standing under Title VII. Yet, such an
analogy would not be helpful if the two Acts were too dissimilar.
The requisite connection between Title VII and Title VIII is pro-
vided by looking to the standing provisions of the respective Acts,
and by assessing the aims of each.
First, the standing provision in Ti.tle'VII is quite similar to that
found in Title VIII. Title VIII provides for the filing of charges of
housing discrimination with the Department of Housing and Urban
Development by a "person aggrieved."2 9 Similarly, Title VII pro-
vides for the filing of charges of employment discrimination with the
EEOC by any "person claiming to be aggrieved.1 30 0 The Sixth Cir-
cuit noted this similarity in EEOC v. Bailey Co.,301 a Title VII case.
In discussing the standing provisions of Titles VII and VIII, the
court stated, "Since both Titles VII and VIII are civil rights acts, it
is difficult to believe that Congress intended such similar language
to have different meanings." 02 It held that the language "person
aggrieved" represented a congressional intent to define standing as
broadly as. permitted under Article III of the Constitution."0
Second, the aims of Titles VII and VIII are similar. Both are
aimed at outlawing discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex,
and national origin. 04 Both "empower persons aggrieved to bring
299. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(d) (1988).
300. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1988).
301. 563 F.2d 439 (6th Cir. 1977).
302. Id. at 453. The court went on to discuss the similarity in design of Titles ViI and ViII,
noting that the only major difference between the two is that, under amendments to Title Vil, the
EEOC possesses public enforcement powers that HUD has not been accorded under Title Viii.
The court nevertheless explained that this difference provided no basis for interpreting the stand-
ing provisions of the two titles differently. Id.
303. Id.
304. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; 42 U.S.C. § 3610.
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private actions to end the alleged discrimination."305 Logically, suc-
cessful enforcement of each promotes interaction between persons of
different colors, sexes, religions, races, and national origins.
This is not to say that Titles VII and VIII are identical. On the
contrary, while Title VIII is limited to eradicating discrimination in
the housing market, 306 Title VII is limited to eradicating discrimina-
tion in the job market.30 7 Nevertheless, for standing purposes, these
apparently distinct aims overlap. In Waters v. Heublein, Inc.,30 8 the
Ninth Circuit summarized the overlap of Titles VII and VIII. It
stated,
[I]n modern America, a person is as likely to ...know his fellow workers
as the tenants next door or down the hall. The possibilities of advantageous
contacts are certainly as great at work as at home. The benefits of interra-
cial harmony are as great in either locale. The distinction between laws
aimed at desegregation and laws aimed at equal opportunity is illusory.
These goals are opposite sides of the same coin." 9
There is thus a commonality of language and purpose between Ti-
tles VII and VIII that lends itself to a useful analogy.
Given the similarity of Title VII and Title VIII, it is helpful to
assess the Court's initial analysis of tester standing in the Title VIII
context. As discussed earlier, the Court first granted standing to a
Title VIII tester in Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman.31 0 In Havens,
two testers, one black and one white, along with the civil rights
group that employed them, sued a landlord under Title VIII for fail-
ing to render truthful housing information.3 1  The Court granted
standing to the black tester, finding that she had been lied to con-
cerning the availability of an apartment. It held that her right to
truthful housing information had been abridged, even though she
was only acting as a tester and even though she was not, in fact,
interested in obtaining an apartment from the defendant. 2
305. Bailey Co., 563 F.2d at 453.
306. 42 U.S.C. § 3610.
307. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
308. 547 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1976). Waters involved a Title VII suit brought by a white em-
ployee who sought to enjoin his employer's discriminatory conduct aimed at certain minority
groups to which the plaintiff did not belong. The court granted the plaintiff standing, finding that
he was "a person claiming to be aggrieved." Id. at 469-70.
309. Id. at 469.
310. 455 U.S. 363 (1982).
311. Id. at 368-69.
312. Id. at 374.
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Nevertheless, the Court denied standing to the white tester. 1 13 It
held that this individual received truthful housing information; the
acknowledgement by the landlord that there was, in fact, an apart-
ment available for rent. Therefore, the Court refused to accord this
plaintiff standing because he failed to claim any injury to his statu-
torily created right.3 14
While there is a temptation to invoke Havens Realty as a basis
for tester standing under Title VII, the holding is not clear enough
to guarantee a court's acceptance of this reasoning. Havens Realty
does indicate that the Court will look to statutory language to deter-
mine whether a right, other than a constitutional right, is created by
the statute. In Havens Realty, the Court found that the Fair Hous-
ing Act created a right to truthful housing information for all per-
sons.315 Therefore, it found that a person deprived of this right
would have standing to sue, and it refused to apply prudential prin-
ciples to bar such sta.nding. 1 6
Nevertheless, an assessment of the holding should not end there.
The Court refused to grant standing to the white tester because it
found he had received truthful housing information. 17 Yet the
Court seemingly ignored the standing language of Title VIII that
grants the right to sue to any person aggrieved,31 8 not merely to any
person failing to receive truthful housing information. The white
tester alleged that he was aggrieved in his loss of interracial benefits
at the hands of the defendant/landlord .3  Had the Court paid
closer attention to the white tester's claim in light of the Act's
standing language, it is arguable that the white tester would have
met the requirements for standing under the constitutional
doctrine. 2 °
Havens Realty opens the door to tester standing both under Title
VIII and beyond. Yet the holding also leaves many questions unan-
swered. After Havens Realty, it is entirely uncertain whether courts
will apply only the constitutional standing doctrine, or whether addi-
tional prudential barriers will be imposed in cases where the appli-
313. Id. at 375.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 372.
316. id.
317. Id. at 375.
318. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(d) (1988).
319. Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 369.
320. Cf. id.
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cable statute appears to invoke standing. It is further uncertain
what type of personal injury will be sufficient for the court to deem
a party aggrieved and thus within the zone of interest of the appli-
cable statute. Using Havens Realty as a guide, a Title VII tester
would be well advised to emphasize the broad scope of the Act and
the congressional intent that all aggrieved persons be accorded the
right to bring a claim.
B. The Policies of Title VII and the Standing Doctrine
For the putative tester there still exists a serious conflict between
the broad aims of Title VII and the limits that the standing doctrine
imposes on adjudication. By assessing the underlying policies of
each, however, these conflicting interests can be reconciled in favor
of testers in Title VII actions.
1. The Policies Underlying Title VII
Title VII was enacted to eradicate employment discrimination on
the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.3 2' It obli-
gates employment agencies, labor organizations, and employers to
follow a policy of equality in employment opportunity..22 Not only
did sponsoring legislators interpret the aims of the statute to be
broad, but opposing congressmen also perceived a far-reaching re-
sult from the proposed legislation.323 Perhaps most importantly, the
Supreme Court has imputed to Title VII a broad aim-that of erad-
icating employment discrimination.324
As written, Title VII provides any "person claiming to be ag-
grieved"3 2 5 with the opportunity to sue for discrimination. This lan-
guage is similar to the language used under the Fair Housing Act,
which grants the right to sue to any "person aggrieved. 32 6 In inter-
preting this language, courts have deemed its use a clear indication
of congressional intent to define standing broadly-as broadly as
permitted under strict constitutional guidelines.327 Arguably, Title
321. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
322. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
323. See supra notes 118-29 and accompanying text.
324. EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 77 (1984) (acknowledging that "the dominant pur-
pose of Title Vl1 is to root out discrimination in employment"); see also supra text accompanying
notes 130-37.
325. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1988).
326. Id. § 3610(a).
327. See supra notes 213-21 and accompanying text (discussing Trafficante).
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VII's standing language is even broader than that of Title VIII. On
its face, Title VII grants the right to sue even to those claiming to
be aggrieved, while Title VIII only grants the right to sue to any
person actually aggrieved. 28
As a practical matter, Title VII may be invoked not only when an
employer acts to discriminate, but also when an employer's policies
have the effect of discriminating against a protected class. 329 Thus,
discriminatory treatment, regardless of the underlying motive, is at
the heart of Title VII. 33
0
Furthermore, even though the Title VII machinery is normally
invoked in response to alleged discriminatory conduct by employers,
its remedies tend toward eradication of discriminatory treatment,
not punishment of the offender.33 Indeed, the conciliatory approach
to enforcement that is favored in the statute itself indicates that it is
primarily aimed at correcting discrimination. 32 Clearly then, the
broad policy underlying Title VII is one of equal opportunity in the
marketplace. If the only concern with testers is whether they met
the criteria for Title VII aims, it would be difficult to oppose their
use. However, the doctrine of standing presents conflicting goals
from that of Title VII. In order to reconcile standing doctrine and
Title VII, it is necessary to understand the sometimes implicit poli-
cies underlying the standing doctrine.
2. The Policies Underlying the Standing Doctrine
The doctrine of standing derives principally from the "cases or
controversies" clause of Article III of the United States Constitu-
tion.33 Essentially, constitutional standing principles require that,
before a court will reach the merits of a case, it must be assured
that the parties have a sufficient stake in the outcome of the contro-
versy.334 In addition to the constitutional requirements, courts have
often employed prudential standing rules to bar adjudication on the
328. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l); 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a).
329. See supra notes 80-93 and accompanying text (discussing the disparate impact theory).
330. See text accompanying note 50.
331. See supra notes 31-48 and accompanying text (discussing remedies available under Title
ViI).
332. See supra text accompanying notes 99-100 (noting that the EEOC will first attempt to
obtain voluntary compliance by the employer).
333. US. CONST. art III, § 2, cl. 1.
334. See supra text accompanying notes 144-47 (generally discussing the constitutional stand-
ing requirements).
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merits."a 5 Underlying the standing doctrine is a crucial policy upon
which that doctrine has been built.
The standing doctrine is employed by modern courts primarily to
prevent litigants from drawing the federal courts into unnecessary
conflicts with coordinate branches of government.3 3 6 Indeed, the Su-
preme Court stated that the doctrine of standing is "built on a sin-
gle basic idea-the idea of separation of powers. 3 37 Yet this pro-
nouncement has not always been so obvious to the Court. In fact,
the Warren Court clearly indicated that standing did not, "by its
own force, raise separation of powers problems," but rather that
such problems arose "if at all, only from the substantive issues the
individual seeks to have adjudicated. 33 8
What has led the Court to address the separation of powers doc-
trine as a threshold standing issue rather than as an issue on the
merits? One possible explanation is that the role of litigation has
changed dramatically in the United States. 39 While the courts were
formerly employed to adjudicate disputes between private individu-
als, they are now employed as vehicles for participation by individu-
als in government policy.340 Accordingly, the courts may have re-
sponded to this shift by erecting rigid standing rules in order to
preserve the balance of powers to the extent possible.34 1
Whether one agrees with this analysis or not, the Court has made
it quite clear that it aims to protect the separation of powers doc-
trine, and that it aims to do so as a threshold standing matter. 42
Essentially then, there exists a conflict between the broad protec-
tions afforded by Title VII and the narrowing aims of the standing
doctrine. Title VII aims to eradicate employment discrimination in
general and grants the right to sue to all aggrieved persons. The
standing doctrine, on the other hand, seeks to limit access to the
courts by imposing constitutional and prudential barriers to federal
court jurisdiction. The Title VII tester is caught in the middle of
this conflict, and it is uncertain which of the conflicting aims, those
335. See supra notes 180-210 and accompanying text (discussing prudential standing
requirements).
336. LAURENCE H. TRIBE. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 109 (2d ed. 1988).
337. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984).
338. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 100-01 (1968).
339. Abram Chayes, Forward: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV.
4, 4-5 (1982).
340. Id.
341. Id. at 9-10.
342. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984).
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of Title VII or those of the standing doctrine and the separation of
powers, will determine the tester's destiny. Perhaps most crucial is
determining which aims should control, or whether the aims can
somehow be reconciled.
As noted, the primary concern of the modern Court, within the
realm of standing, is in maintaining the separation of powers and in
avoiding unnecessary entanglement with the other branches of gov-
ernment. Nevertheless, in the case of Title VII testers, both the ex-
ecutive and legislative branches have endorsed tester standing either
explicitly (in the case of the executive branch), 34 3 or implicitly (in
the case of the legislative branch through the language of the stat-
ute itself).3 44 Thus, it can be seen that, even in the face of criticism
by those who oppose the use of testers, the Court would not be en-
tangling itself with the other branches of government, but would
merely be allowing the law to proceed as dictated, quite consistently
with the separation of powers aims.
3. Executive Approval of Tester Standing
As noted previously, Congress has not only charged the EEOC
with the duty to enforce the guarantees of Title VII on behalf of
aggrieved complainants, but also has entrusted it with the authority
to initiate its own discrimination investigations. 3"' The EEOC's re-
cent endorsement of testers is perhaps best understood in the con-
text of this broad enforcement authority.
First, the EEOC is responsible for the enforcement of only three
acts: Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,
and the Equal Protection Act of 1967.346 Because of its limited
scope, the EEOC has concentrated exclusively on employment dis-
crimination.3 47 It has thus developed expertise that no other govern-
mental body can claim. By virtue of this expertise, the EEOC is in
the best position to determine which policies promote equal
opportunity.
Second, the Commission's recent endorsement of testers is an ob-
vious step toward more effective enforcement. The Supreme
343. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
344. See supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
345. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988). Again, following such investigations, the EEOC is empowered
to bring a Title Vi1 suit on its own behalf. Id.
346. Id.
347. See supra note I10 and accompanying text.
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Court has stated that administrative interpretations of Title VII by
the EEOC are entitled to great deference owing to the Commis-
sion's special expertise.348 This does not mean that any interpreta-
tion made by the EEOC should or will be accepted as law. In fact,
the Court stated, "[C]ourts properly may accord less weight to
[EEOC] guidelines than to administrative regulations which Con-
gress has declared shall have the force of law." 349
Nevertheless, the EEOC's endorsement of testers should be used
to guide courts in their standing determinations. While the endorse-
ment certainly does not possess the force of law, it represents a clear
policy choice that should be given due weight. Furthermore, the en-
dorsement represents an informed judgment, by an experienced and
specially tailored agency, that more must be done to guarantee
equal opportunity in the workplace. By granting standing to testers
in Title VII actions, the Court clearly would not be trudging on the
policies of the executive branch, but would be following the dictates
of that branch.
4. Legislative Approval of Tester Standing
Title VII grants the right to bring a private cause of action to any
"person claiming to be aggrieved."35 ° The legislative history of the
Act reflects an understanding by both proponents and opponents
that Title VII would have broad aims and far-reaching results.3 5'
The Supreme Court acknowledged this broad aim when it stated
that Congress intended for Title VII "to root out discrimination in
employment." '52 Still, the Act does not explicitly grant testers the
right to a private cause of action.
Nevertheless, if a tester can prove that she was aggrieved, she
would appear to meet the criteria for standing as devised by Con-
gress in Title VII. As noted earlier, an individual need not necessa-
rily prove that she was intentionally discriminated against in order
to invoke the Title VII machinery.53 Depending on the circum-
stances, she may be able to prove a Title VII violation via discrimi-
natory impact. 54 Still, opponents of testers point to a number of
348. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971).
349. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 (1976).
350. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1988).
351. See supra notes 117-29 and accompanying text.
352. EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 446 U.S. 54, 77 (1984).
353. See supra notes 80-93 and accompanying text.
354. See supra notes 80-93 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 41:12171266
TITLE VII TESTER STANDING
factors that, they say, call for denial of tester standing in the Title
VII context.
A recently filed case provides an excellent example of the argu-
ments posed by opponents of testers. In Fair Employment Council
of Greater Washington v. B.M.C. Marketing Corp.,355 a civil rights
group and the testers employed by the group sued an employment
agency under the Civil Rights Act of 1866.356 The plaintiffs alleged
that the agency discriminated against the two black testers by fail-
ing to refer them for employment, even though they were qualified
for open positions.5 7
In its motion to dismiss the suit, the defendant's attorney raised
many of the arguments normally asserted against testers. First, he
argued that the testers suffered no actual or threatened injury as a
result of the defendant's alleged conduct. Second, he claimed that
the court should limit access to those litigants best suited to assert a
particular claim. 58 Finally, an amicus brief in support of the de-
fendant pointed out that testers create the potential for trickery and
deceit, and that they generate "suspicion and resentment. 3 59
These points are certainly well taken. However, by discussing
them in order, they can be dismissed, and it becomes clear that test-
ers fall within the broad standing rules envisioned by Congress in
enacting Title VII. First, testers may certainly have suffered an ac-
tual injury, even if they were not the direct objects of discriminatory
treatment. In Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,38 °
both a black and a white tenant sued their landlord for his racially
discriminatory housing policy. While the white tenant was not the
direct object of the discrimination, the Court nevertheless granted
him standing. It held that his loss of interracial benefits represented
a real injury. 61 Similarly, testers under Title VII, because they are
by definition not truly interested in, the jobs they pretend to seek,
are not directly discriminated against. Nevertheless, they may claim
injury from being denied the benefits of a work environment free of
discrimination. Under the standard announced by the Trafficante
355. No. 91-8909-NHJ (D.D.C. filed July 9, 1991).
356. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988).
357. See supra note 9.
358. Employers Are Mounting Campaign, supra note 7, at A-I I.
359. Id.
360. 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
361. Id. at 211-12.
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Court and by later Courts,6 2 such testers could properly claim
aggrievement.
Second, testers are well suited to assert the claims of discrimina-
tion in the workplace. Again, Title VII does not address itself to
those either directly or significantly aggrieved. Rather, Title VII
grants the right to sue to anyone claiming to be aggrieved. 63 While
admittedly begging the question, the best-suited Title VII litigator is
the individual aggrieved by discriminatory practices; there is no bet-
ter plaintiff under Title VII.
Finally, the use of testers is admittedly deceptive. Testers use
false names and credentials and act as if they are seeking jobs when
they are truly not interested in obtaining those jobs. Nevertheless,
one must ask whether their use is 'necessary under the circum-
stances. As noted earlier, discrimination in the workplace remains a
serious problem in this country." 4 It has not and it will not disap-
pear voluntarily.
By enacting Title VII, Congress aimed to eradicate employment
discrimination, not simply to respond to specific instances of it.36 5
Furthermore, any concern with the deceitful aspect of tester evi-
dence is mitigated by the EEOC's endorsement of testers, and its
plans to employ testers in its own investigations. 366 The use of test-
ers in Title VII claims is an idea whose time has come.
III. CONCLUSION
The aims of Title VII and those of the standing doctrine, though
seemingly conflicting, should be reconciled in favor of tester stand-
ing. The concern of federal courts with maintaining separation of
powers would be misplaced by denying standing to testers under Ti-
tle VII. Because both of the other branches have endorsed tester
standing, courts would merely be acting upon the dictates of those
branches in deciding the merits of tester cases. While courts should
continue to concern themselves with the balance of powers and the
limited roles of each branch in our system of government, they may
do so without infringing upon the statutory rights created by Title
362. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982); Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of
Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979).
363. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1988).
364. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
365. See supra note 112-29 and accompanying text.
366. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
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VII. Anyone truly dedicated to equal employment opportunity
should both applaud and encourage the use and standing of testers
in Title VII actions.
Steven G. Anderson

